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NOTES
Bankruptcy"-Liquidating Agents and the Fifth Act of Bankruptcy
Before a creditor can place a debtor into involuntary bankruptcy,
he must allege and prove that the debtor has committed an act of bank-
ruptcy.' While this requirement has been criticized as being detri-
mental to the achievement of bankruptcy objectives, 2 it continues to be
an essential element in creditors' attempts to invoke bankruptcy pro-
ceedings. Section 3a3 of the Bankruptcy Act4 lists the six different
acts that permit creditors to file a petition in involuntary bankruptcy.5
If a person, "while insolvent or unable to pay his debts as they mature,
procured, permitted, or suffered voluntarily or involuntarily the ap-
pointment of a receiver or trustee to take charge of his property,",, he
has committed the fifth act of bankruptcy. In Blair & Co. v. Foley7 the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the appointment of a
liquidating agent under a private liquidation agreement did not consti-
tute the appointment of a receiver or trustee within the meaning of
section 3a(5). In so doing, the Second Circuit appears to have given
section 3a(5) a construction not intended by Congress.
Because of operating losses and capital shrinkage, Blair & Co., a
member of the New York Stock Exchange, decided to undertake a
self-liquidation program. To prevent losses to its customers, Blair
sought the aid of the Special Trust Fund,' established by the New York
1. This is not the only requirement. The petition for involuntary bankruptcy
must be filed by three creditors holding provable claims of at least $500 against a
debtor owing $1,000 or more, and the debtor must also be susceptible to an involuntary
petition under Bankruptcy Act § 4b, 11 U.S.C. § 22(b) (1970). See D. CowANs,
BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 882 (1963) [hereinafter cited as CowANs].
2. See J. MAcLAcHLAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY §§ 64-66
(1956); Treiman, Acts of Bankruptcy: A Medieval Concept in Modern Bankruptcy
Law, 52 HAv. L. REv. 189 (1938) [hereinafter cited as ThEnMAN]; Note, "Acts of
Bankruptcy" in Perspective, 67 HAav. L. REv. 500 (1954).
3. 11 U.S.C. § 21(a) (1970).
4. Bankruptcy Act is the short title given to 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1255 (1970),
which governs all bankruptcy proceedings.
5. An act of bankruptcy is not to be confused with the Bankruptcy Act or
any other piece of legislation dealing with bankruptcy. It simply refers to one of the
six enumerated events which must have occurred before involuntary proceedings can
be brought against a debtor. For a discussion of the origins of the act of bankruptcy
requirement see ThEnmN.
6. BankruptcyAct § 3a(5), 11 U.S.C. § 21(a)(5) (1970).
7. 471 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 93 S. Ct. 1901 (1973) (No. 1154).
8. See Constitution of the New York Stock Exchange, art. XIX, § 1, 2 CCIl
NEw YoRK STOCK ExcANCE GUIDE § 1841 (1972).
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Stock Exchange to assist member firms in avoiding bankruptcy. In
exchange for loans and guarantees from the Fund, the trustees of the
New York Stock Exchange were given the right to appoint a liquidator
of their own choosing. The agreement entered into by Blair with
the New York Stock Exchange gave the liquidator effective control of
the corporation for the purpose of completing the liquidation process.9
Shortly after the appointment, creditors of Blair filed an involuntary
petition in bankruptcy against the corporation in which they alleged
that Blair's consent to the agreement constituted the fifth act of bank-
ruptcy.10  The creditors' motion for summary adjudication was
granted by the referee and upheld by the district court." On appeal
the Second Circuit reversed, holding that the appointment of a liquidator
did not constitute an appointment of a "receiver or trustee" within the
meaning of section 3a(5) of the Act.
The appointment of a receiver or trustee to administer the prop-
erty of an insolvent person was not specified as an act of bankruptcy in
section 3a of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.12 However, a few courts lib-
erally construed a clause in that section to find that the appointment
of such an individual amounted to an assignment for the benefit of credi-
tors (the fourth act of bankruptcy). 3 Expressing approval of these
9. Paragraph VIII of the agreement described the powers and duties of the
liquidating agent as set forth below.
Immediately following his appointment by the Exchange, the Liquidator shall
take control of the business and property of the Corporation for the purpose
of liquidating the business of the Corporation and shall proceed as follows
in connection with the liquidation:
i.) he shall promptly take such steps as he may deem practicable to reduce
the Corporation's operating expenses and to dispose of the Corporation's
salable assets;
ii.) he shall have power to retain independent public accounts, consultants,
counsel and other agents and assistants and shall have power to augment
and reduce or eliminate the staff of the Corporation;
iii.) he shall, as soon as practicable, assert and collect or settle all claims
and rights of the Corporation;
iv.) he shall pay any claim against the Corporation considered by him to
be a valid claim of any customer of the Corporation;
v.) he shall take such other steps as he deems necessary or appropriate to
liquidate the business of the Corporation.
It is agreed that consistent with the duty of the Liquidator to effect a fair
and orderly liquidation of the business of the Corporation to enable prompt
settlement with its customers, the Liquidator shall act in accordance with
what he deems to be good business practice.
471 F.2d at 179-80 n.1.
10. Two other acts of bankruptcy were also alleged in the petition but were
dismissed by the court as no serious effort had been made to support them before the
referee, before the district court, or on appeal to the Second Circuit. Id. at 180 & n.2.
11. Id. at 180.
12. Ch1. 541, § 3a, 30 Stat. 546 (1898).
13. Scheuer v. Smith & Montgomery Book & Stationery Co., 112 F. 407 (5th Cir.
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minority decisions, Congress amended section 3a in 1903 specifically
to include the appointment of a receiver or trustee as an act of bank-
ruptcy;1 4 but the wording of the 1903 amendment created several new
problems. It distinguished between voluntary and involuntary receiv-
ers, required an examination in some cases of why the receivers were
appointed, and left unclear whether insolvency was used in the bank-
ruptcy sense (greater liabilities than assets) or the equity sense (in-
ability to pay one's debts as they mature). In an attempt to remedy
these problems, section 3a was once more amended in 1926.15 Con-
gress again failed to clarify the definition of insolvency, however, which
allowed many failing businesses to use equity receiverships to avoid
bankruptcy administration. To correct this abuse, Congress put sec-
tion 3a(5) into its present form by including both definitions of insol-
vency in the Chandler Act of 1938.16
A receiver is typically defined as a person who is appointed by
a court for the purpose of collecting, caring for, and administering the
property of another, and he is usually regarded as an officer of the
court.17 The normal definition of a trustee is a person who holds legal
title for another.' 8  Because Blair's liquidator was privately appointed
and did not maintain legal title to the property and because a review of
the amendments dealing with the fifth act revealed no intent on the
part of Congress to extend the words "receiver or trustee" beyond their
normally understood definitions, the court reasoned that it could not
construe section 3a(5) to include the appointment of a liquidating
agent. The court found further support for its reading of section 3a
(5) in two other sections of the Bankruptcy Act, section 2a(21) 19
and section 69d.10 Both sections refer to liquidating agents as well as re-
1901); In re Macon Sash, Door & Lumber Co., 112 F. 323 (S.D. Ga. 1901), rev'd
sub nom. Carling v. Seymour Lumber Co., 113 F. 483 (5th Cir. 1902).
14. Act of Feb. 5, 1903, ch. 487, § 2, 32 Stat. 797.
15. Act of May 27, 1926, ch. 406, § 3, 44 Stat. 662-63.
16. Ch. 575, § 3(a), 52 Stat. 844-45 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 21(a)(5) (1970)).
17. 1 R. CLAnT, A TIEATSE ON THE LAw AND PRACTIcE OF RECEVERs § Ila (3d
ed. 1959). There are other types of receivers, but the court in Blair chose to in-
terpret the word to mean a court-appointed receiver. For a discussion of the different
kinds of receivers see id. at § 11-45.
18. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 2, 3(3) (1959).
19. 11 U.S.C. § 11(a)(21) (1970). This section authorizes the bankruptcy
court to "[require receivers or trustees appointed in proceedings not under this Act,
assignees for the benefit of creditors, and agents authorized to take possession of or to
liquidate a person's property to deliver the property in their possession or under their
control" to the bankruptcy court.
20. 11 U.S.C. § 109(d) (1970). The relevant portion reads as follows: "Upon
the filing of a petition under this Act, a receiver or trustee, appointed in proceedings
not under this Act, of any of the property of a bankrupt, an assignee fQr the benefit of
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ceivers and trustees, indicating to the court that when "the draftsmen
desired to cover such an agent, they considered it necessary to say so
and knew how to do it."'2 1
The Blair court's construction of "receiver or trustee" is a study in
contrast to other decisions interpreting section 3a(5). The concern
of prior decisions has been with the scope of the appointee's pow-
ers and the purpose for which he was put in charge of the debtor's as-
sets. To this end, courts have uniformly defined "receiver" to be sim-
ply one who is appointed over all the debtor's property for the purpose
of liquidation.22 Thus, where the receiver was placed in charge of only
a portion of the debtor's property23 or where the receivership was to
foreclose on a mortgage or to enforce a lien on particular property,2 4
the appointment was held not to constitute an act of bankruptcy under
section 3a(5) .25 The courts have likewise defined "trustee" to mean
someone who has effective control of a debtor's assets for the purpose
of liquidation.2 6 In fact, many courts use the words "trustee" and "re-
ceiver" interchangeably in discussing section 3a(5).
Significantly, the vesting of legal title does not seem to be cru-
cial to the definition of trustee under the fifth act of bankruptcy. A
leading case in this respect is Bramwell v. United States Fidelity & Guar-
anty Co.28 in which the assets of a bank were placed, by resolution of
its directors, under the control of the State Superintendent of Banking for
the purpose of liquidation. The United States Supreme Court held that
creditors of a bankrupt, or an agent authorized to take possession of or to liquidate
any of the property of a bankrupt shall be accountable to the bankruptcy court. .. .
21. 471 F.2d at 183.
22. E.g., Steams & Foster Co. v. Pacific Bowling & Billiard Co., 391 F.2d 750,
752 (9th Cir. 1968) (noting that the Supreme Court had reserved a ruling on this
issue on three separate occasions); Otis Elevator Co. v. Monks, 191 F.2d 1000, 1002
(1st Cir. 1951); Elfast v. Lamb, 111 F.2d 434, 436 (2d Cir. 1940). But see In re
211 East Delaware Place Bldg. Corp., 14 F. Supp. 96, 101-02 (N.D. I1. 1936).
23. Tatum v. Acadian Prod. Corp., 35 F. Supp. 40, 48 (E.D. La. 1940).
24. Central Fibre Prod. Co. v. Hardin, 82 F.2d 692, 694 (5th Cir. 1936); Stand-
ard Accident Ins. Co. v. E.T. Sheftall & Co., 53 F.2d 40, 41 (5th Cir. 1931); cf.
Duparquet Huot & Moneuse Co. v. Evans, 297 U.S. 216, 222-23 (1935).
25. It also seems where the purpose of a receiver is to force removal of the
present management of a corporation rather than to liquidate the corporation, the
appointment will not be deemed an act of bankruptcy. 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
3.502 n.2, at 499 (14th ed. J. Moore & L. King 1971) [hereinafter cited as Collier].
26. id. 3.502, at 501; C. NADLER, Tim LAW OF BANKRUPTCY § 461 (2d ed.
S. Nadler & M. Nadler 1965).
27. C. NADLER, supra note 26, § 461; see, e.g., Haubtman & Loeb Co. v. Dunbar
Molasses Co., 13 F.2d 335, 336 (5th Cir. 1926); Bramwell v. United States Fidelity
& Guar. Co., 299 F. 705, 709 (9th Cir. 1924), alrd, 269 U.S. 483 (1926); In re
Metallic Bedstead Co., 98 F. 981, 982 (2d Cir. 1899).
28. 269 U.S. 483 (1926).
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in so doing the bank had committed the fifth act of bankruptcy. The
Court said that the State Superintendent constituted a trustee within the
meaning of section 3a(5) because "[aippellant's duties were in sub-
stance the same as those of a trustee having the legal title of property
for the purpose of converting it into money to be paid over to specific
persons .... Appellant had a power that for present purposes had
the same effect as a title, and that is enough.
29
As in Bramwell, Blair's liquidator had the "power that for pres-
ent purposes had the same effect as a title." He was given complete con-
trol of the corporation for the purpose of liquidation and had the
power to pass legal title of all the corporation's assets.8 0 Under the
facts of Blair the Second Circuit could have construed "trustee" to
include a liquidating agent whose powers were as extensive as Blair's
liquidator.
Blair's reluctance to construe section 3a(5) liberally stemmed
from its interpretation of the policy underlying the requirement of an
act of bankruptcy as a condition precedent to involuntary proceedings.
The purpose of the requirement, according to the court, is to afford
"protection against arbitrary or unjust interference with the property
of the debtor by providing that he shall not be amenable to bankruptcy
at the instance of creditors unless he has done, or suffered to be done,
certain acts, principally concerning his property."' ' - The court seemed
to fear that if it held Blair's liquidator to be within the scope of section
3a(5), it would be intruding on Blair's right to deal freely with its
corporate assets. But once a debtor becomes insolvent, there are
other considerations that suggest that a liberal construction of section
3a(5) would be appropriate. One of the principal objectives of the
Bankruptcy Act is to preserve the bankrupt's assets in order to provide
an equitable distribution of the assets among the bankrupt's creditors
through a uniform proceeding administered by the bankruptcy courts."
Once insolvent, a debtor's property becomes susceptible to rapid dis-
memberment by creditors seeking to recover their interests. This typi-
cally results in a "first come, first served" liquidation process in which
the insolvent's assets are taken by the larger, more efficient creditors at
the expense of the smaller ones. If an act of bankruptcy has occurred,
29. Id. at 491.
30. See note 9 supra.
31. 471 F.2d at 180, quoting 1 COLLIER 3.03, at 403.
32. See, e.g., Young v. Higbee Co., 324 U.S. 204, 210 (1945); Lewis v. Fitzger-
ald, 295 F.2d 877, 878 (10th Cir. 1961); District of Columbia v. Greenbaum, 223 F.2d
633, 636-37 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
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the debtor has manifested that he is no longer able or willing to pro-
tect his creditors' rights in his property.83 Thus, one purpose for
enumerating the six acts of bankruptcy in section 3a was to provide ob-
jective criteria for determining when the debtor should be required
to submit to bankruptcy jurisdiction. 4
The appointment of Blair's liquidator was an indication that the
interests of Blair's creditors were endangered. The corporate assets
were being liquidated under the control of a representative of the trust-
ees of the New York Stock Exchange"3 whose interest in a failing mem-
ber firm would be considerably different than the interests of the
firm's creditors. The liquidation of an insolvent business was being
conducted without the safeguards and uniformity provided by Congress
in the Bankruptcy Act for the protection of creditors. If the act re-
quirements are to serve as indicators that creditors' interests are en-
dangered, as well as to protect the debtor's free use of his property, a
liberal construction of section 3a(5) appears preferable and more
likely to achieve the objectives of the Bankruptcy Act. Such a con-
clusion was reached twenty years ago in In re Bonnie Classics, Inc."
In that case the directors of a corporation filed, as required by New
York law, for a certificate of dissolution and were appointed trustees
of the business for the purpose of making proper distribution of the
corporate assets to creditors and shareholders. The directors opposed
a petition for involuntary bankruptcy on the grounds that their ap-
pointment did not come within the meaning of section 3a(5). The
court concluded:
Any action by one who is insolvent which effectively causes
the transfer of his property to another for final liquidation pur-
poses appoints the transferee a "trustee to take charge of his prop-
erty" under § 3, sub. a(5) . . . . Any other construction would
defeat the objectives of the Bankruptcy Act and abort the broad
powers of the courts of bankruptcy intended for the uniform ad-
ministration of insolvent estates.37
33. Cf. 1 COLLIER 3.03, at 402-03: "These acts usually amount either to ac-
tual or constructive frauds on creditors, or are tantamount to declarations of in-
solvency."
34. See COWANS § 1063; 1 H. REMINGTON, A TREATISE ON THE BANKRUPTCY
LAW OF THE UNrED STATES § 109 (5th ed. 1950); Moore & Tone, Proposed Bank-
ruptcy Amendments: Improvement or Retrogression?, 57 YALE L.J. 683, 708 (1948).
35. See paragraph VIII of the agreement between Blair & Co. and the Special
Trust Fund cited note 9 supra.
36. 116 F. Supp. 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
37. Id. at 648. The Blair court distinguished Bonnie Classics by noting that
there the directors were given legal title, while Blair's liquidator was not. But see
text accompanying notes 28-30 supra.
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The Blair court may have felt compelled to define "receiver" and
"trustee" narrowly because of its analysis of the history of section 3a
(5) and its interpretation of sections 2a(21) and 69d.1s However,
the differences between sections 3a(5), 2a(21), and 69d do not neces-
sarily evidence a Congressional intent to distinguish between receivers,
trustees, and liquidating agents. The references to receivers, trustees,
assignees, and liquidating agents in both section 2a(21) and section
69d were added to the Bankruptcy Act to clarify the bankruptcy
courts' jurisdiction and authority over these non-bankruptcy appointed
"liquidation officers."3 9  At the time of these legislative additions,
there were no reported decisions holding that a privately appointed
liquidating agent, who otherwise met the qualifications of section 3a
(5), did not come within the meaning of "receiver or trustee. ' 40 In
the absence of uncertainty in regard to section 3a(5) and liquidating
agents, such as that which existed in regard to section 2a(21) and sec-
tion 69d, Congress may not have felt it necessary to amend the fifth
act of bankruptcy. 41 The very fact that liquidating agents were
grouped with receivers, trustees, and assignees in section 2a(21) and
section 69d is significant in this respect. The appointment of any one
of the latter three indicates the occurrence of the fourth or fifth act of
bankruptcy. 42 This suggests that, in listing all four liquidation offi-
cers together, Congress indicated an understanding that the appoint-
ment of a liquidating agent was already within one of the acts of bank-
ruptcy just as the other three were.
The Second Circuit adopted a strict construction of section 3a(5)
38. See notes 19-21 and accompanying text supra.
39. 1 COLLIER 2.77; 4 id. 1 69.01[3).
40. This may be due to the fact that many bankruptcy decisions are not ap-
pealed from the referee's decisions and thus go unreported.
41. While this might indicate carelessness on the part of Congressional drafts-
men, failure to amend uniformly where there is no intent to create discrepancies in
meaning is not untypical of the Bankruptcy Act amendments. Witness sections 2a
(21) and 69d. Both sections are designed to deal with the same individuals; yet
when Congress added liquidating agents to § 2a(21), it failed to do the same to
§ 69d. It was not until 1952 that Congress corrected this discrepancy. See 4
COLLIER 69.01[3]. There is other evidence suggesting that "receiver or trustee" can
be defined to include liquidating agents though the words cannot be read to in-
clude such an agent when found in other sections of the Bankruptcy Act. Emil v.
Hanley, 318 U.S. 515, 522 (1943) (the Court sanctioned a distributive definition of
the word "receiver" when found in different sections of the Act when such an inter-
pretation was necessary to prevent a misreading of Congressional intent). The word-
ing of § 69d reveals further support. In § 69d "receiver" and "trustee" are defined to
include a receiver or trustee appointed over only a portion of the debtor's property;
whereas "receiver" and "trustee" have been defined by the courts to mean only a re-
ceiver or trustee put in charge of all the debtor's property. Cases cited note 22 supra.
42. 11 U.S.C. H9 21a(4)-(5) (1970).
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in Blair to conform with the specific policy that it perceived behind the
fourth and fifth acts of bankruptcy. 43 Under the court's analysis a re-
ceiver is typically viewed as an appointed officer of the court and a
trustee is considered to have legal title to the property he holds. There-
fore if the debtor's property were in the possession of either individual,
the debtor's creditors would be required to proceed in one manner or
another against the receiver or trustee as well as the debtor himself. The
court noted that this would also be true if there were a general assign-
ment for the benefit of creditors, but not if the person possessing the
property were merely an agent. The policy behind section 3a(4) and
section 3a(5), the court said, is to allow creditors to invoke bankruptcy
relief only if the debtor has allowed such an obstacle to be placed in
the way of his creditor's claims. 44  Since the appointment of a liqui-
dating agent has been held not to be an assignment for the benefit of
creditors45 and the policy behind the fourth and fifth acts was al-
legedly the same, the court failed to see why the appointment of a liq-
uidating agent should constitute the fifth act.40
The problem with the court's analysis is that sections 3a(4) and
3a(5) are separate and distinct acts of bankruptcy. They are designed
to cover two different events that affect the debtor's property. The
conclusion that if a liquidating agent were not an assignee, he would
also not be a receiver or trustee seems to ignore a distinction specifi-
cally recognized by Congress. The court's policy argument also sug-
gests that the court believed creditors were in a stronger position than
bankruptcy courts when it came to pursuing a claim against a debt-
or's liquidating agent, an opinion not shared by Congress. If a liqui-
dator is truly nothing more than an agent of the debtor, the bankruptcy
court's jurisdiction over the debtor would provide the requisite jurisdic-
tion over his agent.47 Yet sections 2a(21) and 69d were added to
the Bankruptcy Act in 1938 because "there was a real necessity for stat-
ing clearly what status non-bankruptcy liquidation officers occupy...
and the extent of the bankruptcy court's control over them."48  If, as
43. 471 F.2d at 181-82.
44. Id.
45. In re Ambrose Matthews & Co., 229 F. 309 (D.NJ.), a! 'd, 236 F. 539
(3d Cir. 1916). But see In re R.V. Smith, 38 F. Supp. 57 (W.D. Okla. 1941), which
held that the appointment of a liquidating trustee was an assignment for the benefit of
creditors. Blair found its reasoning unpersuasive but did not say why.
46. 471 F.2d at 181-82.
47. See Reifsnyder v. B. Levy & Sons, 88 F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1937); In re Muncie
Pulp Co., 139 F. 546 (2d Cir. 1905).
48. 4 COLLmR 69.01, at 1065.
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Blair reasoned, a liquidating agent presents no obstacles to ordinary
creditor's remedies, then one is left with the question of why Congress
felt it necessary to give bankruptcy courts jurisdiction over liquidating
agents. The answer appears to be that liquidating agents do present
an obstacle to ordinary creditor remedies. As in the case of receivers,
trustees, or assignees, Blair's liquidator had authority, by virtue of
the agreement between the corporation and the Special Trust Fund, to
liquidate the corporate assets as he saw fit and not according to Blair's
dictates. 49  Therefore, it would seem reasonable to treat the appoint-
ment of a liquidating agent whose powers were as extensive as Blair's
as the equivalent of a receiver or trustee.50
While private liquidation agreements of brokerage firms are not
likely to present a section 3a(5) issue in the future,51 the Blair deci-
sion appears to have opened a door to a procedure which will permit
insolvent businesses to defeat the broad objectives of the Bankruptcy
Act. The court's decision will permit insolvent businesses to place ef-
fective control of the business's assets in the hands of private liquidating
agents and allow the liquidation process to be accomplished without
the safeguards and uniformity of administration provided for by the
Bankruptcy Act. The decision indicates that Congress will have to
amend section 3a(5) if it wants to prevent the subversion through pri-
vate liquidation agreements of the creditors' ability to invoke bank-
ruptcy proceedings.
STUART WILLIAMS
Civil Procedure-A Possible Solution to the Problem
of "Sewer Service" in Consumer Credit Actions
Notice of a lawsuit is one of the most important elements of an
individual's right to due process of law under the fourteenth amendment.1
Nevertheless, each day in large cities thousands of default judgments
49. See note 9 supra.
50. See 1 COLLIER I 3.503, at 503.
51. Future problems involving the insolvency of brokerage firms will be han-
dled by the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-lll (1970).
See Note, The Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970: A New Federal Role in
Investor Protection, 24 VAND. L. REv. 586, 606-13 (1971).
1. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306, 313-16 (1950).
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are entered against consumer-debtors who have never received notice of
pending litigation.2 Despite numerous attempts to solve the problem
through changes in local rules of civil procedure,' licensing of process-
servers,4 and institution of criminal prosecutions, "sewer service" con-
tinues unabated." In November of 1972, however, the consent decree
in United States v. Brand Jewelers, Inc.7 established procedures that
might provide a viable solution to the problem, if they were generally
implemented in similar cases. This note will outline the procedures re-
quired by this decree and examine its intended effect on the practice of
"sewer service."
BACKGROUND
"Sewer service" has been defined as the "fraudulent service of a
summons and a complaint, usually either by destroying it, by leaving it
under a door or in a mailbox, or by leaving it with a person known not to
be the defendant; and then executing an affidavit stating that the sum-
mons was personally delivered to and left with the defendant."" The
practice is common in consumer-credit actions in areas of high-volume
litigation involving relatively trivial amounts.9 Studies have revealed
its use in New York,10 Washington," Chicago,'" Boston,'8 Detroit,' 4
and Los Angeles.' 5 Because of technicalities in the Civil Practice Laws
2. See text accompanying notes 10-16 infra.
3. E.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 308 (McKinney Supp. 1970); N.Y.C. CIVIL
CT. AcT § 1402 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
4. N.Y. CrrY, N.Y., LOCAL LAws No. 80 § B32-451.0 (1969).
5. DeFeis, Abuse of Process and its Impact Upon the Poor, 46 ST. JOHN'S
L. REv. 1, 11 (1971); see note 30 infra.
6. See public Hearings on Debt Collection Practices Before the FTC, (Sep. 13,
1971) (testimony of David Paget, Assistant United States Attorney for the Southern
District of New York).
7. Civ. No. 70-179 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 1972).
8. Public Hearings on Abuses in the Service of Process Before Louis J. Lefko-
witz, Attorney General of the State of New York 2 (1966) (testimony of Frank
Pannizzo, Assistant Attorney General).
9. See Comment, Sewer Service and Confessed Judgments: New Protection for
Low-Income Consumers, 6 HARv. Civ. RIGHTs-Cv. LiB. L. REv. 414 (1971).
10. D. CAPLowrrz, DnBTOS IN DEFAULT (1971).
11. See Public Hearings Before the Nat'l Comm'n on Consumer Finance, (Juno
22-23, 1970) (testimony of Maribeth Holloran, Attorney, Neighborhood Legal Services,
Washington, D.C.) (hereinafter cited as 1970 Hearings).
12. D. CAPLowrrz, supra note 10, at 11-7; 1970 Hearings (testimony of Judson H.
Miner, Attorney, Chicago Council of Lawyers).
13. See 1970 Hearings (testimony of Blair C. Shick, Attorney, Natl Consumer
Center, Boston College Law School).
14. D. CAPLOwriZ, supra note 10, at 11-7.
15. See Project, The Direct Selling Industry: An Empirical Study, 16 U.C.L,A.L.
REv. 883, 926 (1969).
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of New York,' the practice is more prevalent in New York City than
anywhere else.
The causes of sewer service are myriad, but foremost among them
is the very nature of the consumer-credit action. An attorney who con-
ducts a collection practice necessarily operates on a high-volume, low-
overhead basis and cannot afford to pay an adequate fee for private
service in states where it is permitted by law.1" The average fee of one
dollar and fifty cents' s for each service affected by a private process
server is little incentive to that server to search diligently for an individ-
ual.:" The fee is barely sufficient to pay for his transportation. In
jurisdictions where service must be made by an officer of the court,
such as North Carolina, 0 there is still strong incentive to use sewer
service. The process server is usually the local law enforcement offi-
cer, who thus has no financial incentive but who is likely to feel that
his time is too valuable to be spent in personally serving process on a
consumer whom he feels will be likely to take a default judgment in any
case. Consequently, there is pressure on both public and private process
servers to take the "short-cut . . . to the nearest sewer."1
2
'
Sewer service is almost impossible to detect. The consumer-de-
fendants are usually unaware of their rights and accept default judgments
and wage garnishment because the amounts involved are less than the
costs of hiring an attorney. Even if a defendant attempts to vacate a
judgment on the ground that he was not served, he is faced with an almost
impossible burden of proof: he must prove by clear and convincing evi-
16. See DeFeis, supra note 5, at 4-6 and statutes cited.
17. In only three of the six jurisdictions where studies have revealed the prevalence
of sewer service is service by private party permitted in all cases. CAL. Civ. PRo.
CODE § 414.10 (West 1971); MICH. STAT. ANN. Rule 103(1) (1972); N.Y. CIV. PRAc.
LAw § 2103(a) (McKinney Supp. 1970). The remaining three require service to be
completed by a public officer unless a private party is specifically designated by the
court. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3902(a) (Supp. IV, 1971); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A,
§ 103(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1971); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 223, § 27 (1971).
18. Tuekheimer, Service of Process in New York City: A Proposed End to
Unregulated Criminality, 72 COLUM. L. Rnv. 847, 861 (1972).
19. See note 21 infra.
20. N.C.R. CIV. PRo. 4(a).
21. Tuekneimer, supra note 18, at 868. Professor Tuekheimer feels that there
are two temptations that lead process servers to improper conduct: first, the remote and
disorganized nature of the victims; and secondly, the fact that "it is not easy for
process servers, almost all of whom are white, to venture alone into black neighbor-
hoods, find a specific person, inform him that he is being sued, and then hand him a
piece of paper setting in operation machinery that may end with property attachment
and income execution." Id. These temptations apply to both private and public
process servers alike.
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dence both that he was never served on that date22 and that he has a valid
defense to the creditor's claim.23
This burden might be easier to meet in a class action. Individual
hearings usually result in a swearing contest between the consumer and
the process server. Thus, a large number of consumers, all claiming
not to have been served by a particular process-server, would serve as
much stronger circumstantial evidence that sewer service actually oc-
cured. But any possibility of a class action in federal courts is foreclosed
by Snyder v. Harris,24 which prohibits accumulating claims to reach the
jurisdictional amount in a class action. Likewise, in many states a con-
sumer class action cannot be maintained on the theory that there is in-
sufficient class interest.25
Action taken by the state and federal governments have been un-
successful, for the most part, in alleviating this situation. Procedural
reforms were instituted in New York expressly to remove the incentive
for "sewer service," but these only led to new forms of abuses. 20
A licensing ordinance was enacted in New York City to regulate
process servers and to enforce complaints 27 but the New York Depart-
ment of Consumer Affairs, whose responsibility it is to detect and punish
infractions, was already over-burdened with consumer-credit and land-
lord-tenant suits and could not afford to devote adequate resources to
enforce the ordinance.2"
Criminal actions have been brought by the federal government
against process servers under two statutes: for filing false affidavits of
non-military service under the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of
194029 or for wilfully depriving a person of his constitutional rights
22. Dineed v. Myers, 278 App. Div. 658, 102 N.Y.S.2d 596 (2d Dep't 1951);
Denning v. Lettenty, 48 Misc. 2d 185, 186, 264 N.Y.S.2d 619, 621-22 (Sup. Ct. 1965);
see United States v. Barr, 295 F. Supp. 889, 892 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
23. See, e.g., Roth v. Perry, 158 N.Y.S.2d 122 (Saratoga County Ct. 1957).
24. 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
25. E.g., Hall v. Coburn Corp. of America, 26 N.Y.2d 396, 259 N.E.2d 720,
311 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1970).
26. Our experience in examining more than three hundred services reportedly
made in compliance with this new amendment belies its projected remedial
qualities. Thus we have discovered that some process servers alleging this
form of service have consistently invented the names of fictitious people who
they claim they left a copy of the summons and complaint with at the place of
employment of the person being sued.
Public Hearings on Debt Collection Practices before the FTC, (Sep. 13, 1971) (testi-
mony of David Paget, Assistant United States Attorney for the Southern District of
New York).
27. N.Y. CrrY, N.Y. LocAL LAws No. 80 § B32-451.0 (1969).
28. DeFeis, supra note 5, at 20.
29. 50 U.S.C. § 520(1) (1970) requires as a condition precedent to default judg-
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under the 1866 Civil Rights Act.3" These actions have been singularly
unsuccessful; the majority have resulted in suspended sentences and rel-
atively small fines"' while only one has resulted in a prison sentence.32
In United States v. Brand Jewelers, Inc.33 the federal government
launched a different attack against sewer service. Brand, which had
brought the third largest number of lawsuits of any plaintiff in the civil
court of the City of New York, had been the subject of a study that re-
vealed that it had engaged in a long-standing practice of predatory sales
tactics.34 Its salesmen would go from door to door, or to the factories
on payday, selling overpriced watches and rings on "easy credit" terms
with no downpayment required. Many of its customers never received
a copy of the contract or even a payment book.35  In 1964 Brand se-
cured 5,360 default judgments, 97.7 percent of the total suits it brought.
Often the first notice that consumer-debtors ever received of these actions
was when their employers gave them notice of the execution of the judg-
ment on their income.m
The United States brought suit37 against Brand Jewelers, its at-
ment that the plaintiff file an affidavit stating that the defendant is not a member of
the armed forces. If the defendant is in the military, the act requires an attorney to
be appointed for him. If the plaintiff is unable to ascertain whether or not the de-
fendant is in the military, the court may require him to file a bond. If the plaintiff
does not obtain such an affidavit, the judgment may be voided by the defendant.
50 U.S.C. § 520(2) (1970) makes it a misdemeanor to knowingly file a false
affidavit under this section.
30. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1970).
31. E.g., United States v. Barr, 295 F. Supp. 889 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (constitutional
issues raised on motion to dismiss indictment); United States v. Lindsay, Cr. No.
68-994 (S.D.N.Y., filed and entered nolle prosequi June 30, 1971); United States v.
Tauber, Cr. No. 70-25 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 23, 1971) (pleaded guilty to four counts of
mail fraud, fined $1000); United States v. Bialo, Cr. No. 68-888 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 3,
1971) (one year suspended sentence); United States v. Kaufman, Cr. No. 70-406
(S.D.N.Y., Jan. 15, 1971) (one year suspended sentence); United States v. Rick,
Cr. No. 68-994 (S.D.N.Y., Dec. 12, 1969) (one year suspended sentence); United
States v. Wiseman, Cr. No. 68-994 (S.D.N.Y., May 16, 1969) (one year suspended
sentence.
32. United States v. Siegel, Cr. No. 72-2416 (2d Cir., judgment affirmed Feb. 22,
1973 (6 month sentence for violation of 50 U.S.C. § 520: knowingly filing a false
affidavit of non-military service.)
33. 318 F. Supp. 1293 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
34. D. CAPLOWrrZ, supra note 10, at 7-21 to 7-24.
35. Id. at 7-26.
36. Id. at 11-8.
37. The United States invoked the federal court's jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1345 (1970). The cause of action was extraordinary in that the government's standing
was based on no specific federal statute, but rather on the general right of the federal
government to resort to its own courts to vindicate a substantial federal interest. See
Note, The United States Government Has Standing to Sue for the Violation of Four-
teenth Amendment Rights of an Individual, 37 BRooKLYN L. Rav. 426 (1971); Note,
Federal Government May Sue to Protect Due Process Rights of "Sewer Service" Vic-
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torney, and various process servers to vacate all unlawfully obtained de-
fault judgments, to obtain restitution,38 and to enjoin the further use of
"sewer service." The Government alleged that Brand and the other
defendants, "as a matter of long-standing and systematic practice," had
an understanding by which the process-serving defendants knew that
personal service was "neither expected nor desired by Brand" and that
Brand and its attorney knew or had reason to know of this practice.8 0
Brand's motion to dismiss the suit for lack of standing was denied on
two grounds. First, the court felt that the government had a sufficient
interest since the alleged activities of the defendants had resulted in
interference with interstate commerce. Alternatively, the court based
standing upon the government's interest in ending "widespread depriva-
tions (i.e., deprivations affecting many people) of property through
'state action' without due process of law."40 Brand did not appeal, and
two years later the action was finally settled by the consent decree. 1
THE DECREE
The consent decree was divided into two sections. The first set
forth a procedure for the vacation of all default judgments obtained from
January 1, 1969, to December 31, 1971, while the second part attempted
to insure proper notice of future litigation. The first section required the
United States Attorney to write to each judgment debtor to inform him
of his right to have the judgment vacated and to secure a trial on the
merits. The debtor could secure these rights by simply returning a
stamped postcard included in the letter from the Government. If the
debtor requested a trial, Brand was to account for and return with in-
terest any excess funds previously received.
tims, 46 N.Y.U.L. REv. 367 (1971); Note, United States Has Standing to Seek Injcnc-
lion Against Practice of Obtaining Default Judgments Through False Affidavits Certify-
ing Service of Process, 24 VAND. L. Rav. 829 (1971); Note, A New Approach to Legal
Assistence for Ghetto Residents or an Invitation to Executive Lawmaking?, 17 WAYNE
L. REV. 1287 (1971); Note, Nonstatutory Standing to Sue on the Part of the United
States Under the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment, 1971 Wis. L.
REv. 665.
38. The federal government sought to require Brand Jewelers to bring the actions
against consumers de novo in the state court. Brand Jewelers was to account for all
amounts collected pursuant to the first judgment and repay amounts in excess of the
new judgment to the consumers with 6% interest running from the date of collection.
318 F. Supp. at 1295.
39. Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law at 20-21, United States v. Brand Jewelers,
Inc., 318 F. Supp. 1293 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
40. 318 F. Supp. at 1299.
41. Consent Decree, United States v. Brand Jewelers, Inc., Civ. No. 70-179
(S.D.N.Y. 1972) [hereinafter cited as Consent Decree].
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The second part of the decree attempted to control the problem
of sewer service in the future.42 First, it imposed broad duties upon
Brand's attorney to insure the correctness of service in all future con-
sumer-credit suits, and secondly, it required him to follow specific pro-
cedures in monitoring the service of process and investigating allega-
tions of fraudulent service.
Four duties were imposed upon the plaintiff's attorney under this
plan. First, he must investigate every situation where he has "good
cause to believe that service of process was not lawfully made or that
the affidavit of service of process was not lawfully made or that the
affidavit of service or of non-military service was fraudulently made."4
Secondly, he has the duty to monitor the manner in which process is
assigned and accomplished to ascertain whether all steps are being taken
to insure proper service. 44 Thirdly, he must move to vacate any judg-
ment when there is substantial evidence of unlawful service.45  Finally,
he must switch process-serving agencies when there is evidence that it
is serving false affidavits.46 The effect of these four provisions is to
render Brand's attorney subject to criminal prosecution for the federal
crimes of mail fraud47 or of causing non-military affidavits to be filed
with the knowledge that they were false,48 by removing the defense of
lack of knowledge.49
The decree prescribes specific steps to insure that the creditor-plain-
tiff's attorney complies with that duty. In order to understand how
these proceedings have altered Brand's usual procedure for suing in con-
sumer-credit transactions, it is expedient to trace a hypothetical suit
brought under this new procedure.
Assume that Brand is owed one hundred dollars by consumer C,
who has stopped making payments on this debt. Brand turns the cus-
tomer's file over to its attorney, A, who files a complaint in civil court
requesting judgment for the one hundred dollar debt plus costs. The
clerk gives A a docket number, and A then takes the complaint and
gives it to a private process-serving agency. The agency would norm-
42. This part of the decree is operative from January 1, 1973 until December 31,
1975, and may be extended for a period of 3 years if any party is judged in contempt.
Consent Decree f 23.
43. Consent Decree 1 10.
44. Consent Decree ff 11.
45. Consent Decree 12.
46. Consent Decree f 13.
47. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970).
48. 50 U.S.C. § 520(2) (1970).
49. See Tuekheimer, supra note 18, at 867.
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ally take all responsibility for serving the process and for executing the
affidavits of service and non-military service.50 A would then file these
as his proof of service, wait ten days, and move for default judgment. 1
Instead, under this decree, when A hands the docketed complaint over
to an agency he must record in a log the name of the agency and the
name and license number of the process server to whom the complaint
is given for service. When service is completed, A must also enter the
date, precise time and mode of service, and if substitute service is made
on a person of suitable age and discretion, the name and address of the
person served and his relationship to the party sued. When proof of
service is filed, the affidavit must include the precise time of service.
If C suffers a default judgment as a result of sewer service the speci-
ficity of the information in the log and affidavit makes it simpler for C
to refute the allegations of service in a hearing to vacate judgment.52
Thus this procedure provides a means to rectify sewer service once it
occurs. But if the decree stopped at this point, it would not have solved
the problem of the vast majority of consumers who are entirely unaware
of their rights, who are unable to afford an attorney, and who therefore
never get as far as a hearing.
Again, assume that A has filed his proof of service. Normally he
would merely wait the requisite ten days and then move for default
judgment. Under this decree, however, within five working days from
proof of service A must write a letter to C at the address where he was
alleged to have been served. The letter must inform C in Spanish as
well as English of the fact that he is being sued, of all the relevant de-
tails of the alleged service of process, and that if he has not been so
50. So long as there is no direct proof of knowledge by the attorney that sewer
service has taken place, he is not criminally liable. See United States v. Kalkin, Cr.
No. 69-864 (S.D.N.Y., Sep. 15, 1971) (conviction of attorney for mail fraud not di-
rectly related to sewer service when indictment under 1866 Civil Rights Act, 18
U.S.C. § 242 (1970), failed for lack of knowledge); United States v. Shenghit, Cr.
No. 71-928 (S.D.N.Y., filed Aug. 26, 1971) (attorney pled guilty to charge of causing
non-military affidavits to be filed with knowledge they were false).
51. N.Y.C. CviL Cr. Acr § 402 (McKinney 1963).
52. Under current New York procedure, the affidavit of personal service need
only state the date on which service was completed and, if substitute service is made
on a person of suitable age and discretion at the defendant's place of work or residence,
need not state the person's name, description, or even sex. Thus under current pro-
cedure, in order to prove he was not served, C must prove he was not home at all
on the date service was alleged. See Tuekheimer, supra note 18, at 854-55. Moreover,
if service was alleged on a person of suitable age and discretion, then C must prove
that no one was home on that date. The information given by the logs that A must
maintain limits the number of times at which and persons upon whom service might
have been effected, and thus substantially reduces his burden of proof. See text ac-
companying note 22 -upra.
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served, he should indicate that fact by signing and mailing a postcard
included in the letter. It also must explain his obligation to respond, the
possibilities of default judgment and garnishment with their adverse ef-
fects on his credit rating, and the availability of free legal assistance.
There are then three possible events that could occur: C could
receive A's letter but not return the postcard; C could receive the letter
and return the postcard to A; or the letter could be returned to A
stamped "Addressee Unknown." The decree provides a separate pro-
cedure for each case.
In the first situation if C does not file an answer, A must wait
thirty days from the date of the letter's delivery before filing his petition
for default judgment. He must also file an affidavit swearing that he
has mailed the letter as required by the decree. Under these circum-
stances it is safe to assume that C had decided to permit default judgment
against him. The requirements of the Spanish translation, the deletion
of the merchant's name from the envelope53 and the use of certified
mail virtually insure that the letter was read and understood. C is thus
in a position to know his rights and to be able to decide rationally whether
or not to litigate the claim.
What if C receives the letter, but returns the postcard to A and
claims that process was never served on him? Then the decree requires
that A enter C's name in a log of parties who have claimed that they were
not properly served, along with the name of the process server who al-
legedly made the service. He must then discontinue the lawsuit and start
again. However, since A may now safely assume that C is aware of
his intent to sue, the decree does not require A to write C a letter
in the second suit, but instead allows him to proceed, after proof of
second service, to file an affidavit of compliance and petition for
default judgment. This procedure assures that C is aware of his
rights and is on notice that the merchant is suing him. At the same time
the procedure prevents the possible abuse of C's repeated return of the
postcard to postpone the suit indefinitely.
What if A's letter is returned stamped "Addressee Unknown"?
When he receives a returned letter, the decree requires that A make a
full investigation to ascertain what has occurred. C may have moved
53. Brand was found in Professor Caplowitz's study to have utilized insulting
letters and phone calls, threats to contact and the actual contact of friends and relatives
and, most frequently, employers. This provision assures that the consumer does not
discard the letter, believing it to be another of these insulting letters. D. CAPLovrrZ,
supra note 10, at 10-16.
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since service was made, may have refused delivery, or may, in fact, have
been the victim of sewer service. The lawsuit is to be delayed until A
determines that C was indeed residing at the address appearing on the
letter at the time the service was attempted and until A has made a good
faith determination that there is no reason to believe that the party
sued did not receive legal notice. A must enter the name and the ad-
dress appearing on the returned letters in a journal that will be subject
to periodic inspection by the United States Attorney's Office. A is also
required to record the nature, details, and conclusions of every investi-
gation made therein. Only when A has made this good faith determin-
ation that C has received notice may he file an affidavit of compliance
and petition for default judgment.
Under current New York procedure, once A obtains a default judg-
ment he may obtain an income execution. 4 He would then deliver the
income execution to the City Marshall, who would give it to C's em-
ployer.5 5 Ordinarily C would not learn about execution until his pay-
check was reduced by ten percent. Under the decree, however, A must
write C at least ten days prior to income execution informing him in
Spanish as well as in English of the pending proceedings. Thus C is
given a final chance to pay the judgment or to contest it in a hearing
to reopen the judgment.
The procedure of the decree discourages sewer service in two ways:
by an in terrorem effect caused by greater enforceability of criminal
sanctions against the process-server and Brand's attorney and by an
economic effect caused by the increased costs to the plaintiff or bring-
ing suit.
The procedures of the decree provide the state and federal author-
ities with an excellent source of evidence for use against the process-
servers in criminal prosecutions.5 By examining the records of process
allegedly served by a particular process-server on a certain day, for
example, it might be possible to show that the process-server claimed to
have been in two places at the same time. The returned letters and
subsequent investigations might reveal that he claimed personal service
54. N.Y. Civ. PrAc. LAw § 5231 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
55. Id.
56. A process-server who commits sewer service may be guilty of federal crimes:
e.g., aiding and abetting wilful subjection of an individual to the deprivation of his
constitutional rights under 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1970), see United States v. Wiseman,
445 F.2d 792 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 967 (1971); mail fraud under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1341 (1970); filing a false affidavit of non-military service under 50 U.S.C. § 502(2)
(1970). He may also be guilty of committing such state crimes as perjury and fraud.
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upon someone who had been dead two years or was abroad on the date
service was alleged. 57 These records have the advantage of ready avail-
ability and low cost to the authorities. The government may easily
monitor the process-serving industry without great expense. Thus the
process-servers have a strong incentive to make actual service.
Brand's attorney shares this incentive. Under the terms of the decree
he may be punished by a contempt citation if he does not monitor the
method by which process is served. But when he does monitor the
method of service he is chargeable with knowledge of any sewer service
that occurs and may be prosecuted under the 1866 Civil Rights Act,"
for wilfully depriving an individual of his constitutional rights.
The procedures of the decree are also designed to decrease the
profits the process-serving agencies derive from utilizing "sewer service."
An attorney involved in the collection of small debts from consumers
would naturally desire to keep his transaction costs as low as possible.59
Normally he would seek to minimize costs by employing the process-
serving agency that gave the quickest, cheapest service-inevitably that
which employed "sewer service" most frequently. The procdures under
this decree effectively prohibit Brand's attorney from reducing his costs
in this way by requiring him to put each agency on notice that he will
change to another if he finds it to be employing sewer service.6" The
process-serving agency is thus given an economic incentive to complete
service of process if it wishes to maintain its account with Brand.
The procedures of the decree, however, increase Brand's costs of
litigation irregardless of its use of "sewer service." The agencies will
charge Brand's attorney a higher fee for effecting service in the manner
required. The amount of paperwork that Brand's attorney must com-
plete to maintain the suit is greatly increased. 61 Ultimately Brand's at-
torney will pass these costs on to his client. Thus Brand will be required
57. Instances such as these are quite commonplace in New York and Chicago.
See Public Hearings on Debt Collection Practices Before the FTC, (testimony of
David Paget, Assistant United States Attorney, Southern District of New York) at 6-7;
1970 Hearings (testimony of Judson H. Miner, Attorney, Chicago Council of Lawyers)
at 2-6.
58. 28 U.S.C. § 242 (1970).
59. See text accompanying note 17, eupra.
60. Consent Decree 14.
61. The decree requires that four separate logs be maintained, and that letters
be sent to each defendant. Each time a letter is returned unanswered it must be in-
vestigated, and the attorney must make a good faith determination of its results.
Before a default judgment can issue, the attorney himself must review the case and
swear in an affidavit that he has followed all the required procedures. Consent Decree
If 2, 7.
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to bear this burden of higher costs for the duration of the decree, no
matter how accurately its agents complete service. Since this will hardly
serve in itself as an incentive for accurate service, it can only be justified
as the cost necessary to implement the procedure.
FUTURE APPLICATIONS OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE DECREE
This decree may prove useful in the future either as a model decree
for similar litigation or as a model for a statute. 2 Although restricting
its use to a model decree would have the advantage of preventing the
burden of increased cost from falling on honest merchants, such a
restricted use would have severe disadvantages. The problems of litigat-
ing each case are too great,63 and sewer service is too widespread in that
segment of the consumer-credit industry catering to low-income con-
sumers64 for a case-by-case attack to be effective.
If these procedures were applied by a narrowly drawn statute-for
example, one applicable only to consumer-credit actions-the burden
of increased costs would inevitably fall on some honest merchants, as
well as those who employ "sewer service." Clearly, any legislature con-
sidering statutory adoption of these procedures would have to balance
the burdens of increased costs against the benefits from the elimination
of "sewer service."
There are several basic policies that would seem to support imposi-
tion of this burden upon the merchant. This burden would fall most
heavily on those merchants who rely on default judgments and garnish-
ment proceedings to collect their debts. These merchants are most likely
to be engaged in high-risk credit sales to low-income individuals. Al-
though it has long been thought desirable to stimulate trade,65 public
policy favors strict regulation and even discouragment of the "no money
down," "easy credit" sales industry because of its predatory nature.66
Furthermore, although the courts should be as accessible as possible to
62. See note 68 infra.
63. Proof of a "long standing and systematic practice" as was alleged in Brand,
see text accompanying note 39 supra, requires an extensive study. In addition other
jurisdictions may be unwilling to grant the federal government standing, see note 37
supra.
64. See notes 10-16 supra.
65. One major policy of the law of negotiable instruments under the U.C.C.,
for example, is to decrease the expense and increase the speed of actions for a creditor
to secure payments. See, e.g., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-305.
66. See Peterson, Representing the Consumer Interest in the Federal Government,
64 MICH. L. REv. 1323 (1966).
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litigants, 67 the court dockets are already much too crowded to require
the courts to function as glorified collection agencies. Indeed, there
is a very strong policy in favor of encouraging private settlement of dis-
putes. 8 In any case, the burden would fall most heavily on those mer-
chants who repeatedly resort to the courts. Consequently, the policy of
encouraging private settlement would be furthered, while the courts
would remain open to settle bona fide disputes.
Merchants will no doubt attempt to pass this burden on to the con-
sumer who buy their products. The procedure of the decree incerases
costs of those merchants who cater to low-income individuals more than
those who sell to wealthier customers. This increase may in turn be
passed on to high-risk consumers who are already plagued by higher-
than-average prices, or it may discourage sales to these individuals al-
together. The legislature should weigh this possibility as well in deter-
mining the desirability of enacting this procedure. Ultimately the de-
cision should rest upon policy decisions based on empirical data gained
from the results in the Brand Jewelers case.0 9 If the experience gained
from the Brand Jewelers decree shows that it is possible through its im-
plementation to reduce "sewer service" without substantially increasing
the costs of goods bought by the inhabitants of lower income neighbor-
hoods and without unduly burdening the innocent merchant, then clearly
these procedures would be well worth adopting on a statutory basis for
all consumer-credit actions.7 0
JAMES STODDARD HAYES, JR.
67. One major policy in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is to make the
courts more open to all litigants. See Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir.
1944).
68. The U.C.C. reflects this policy in its encouragement of "cover" rather than
suit. Compare UNiFORm COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-712 with UNEFoRM COMmRCIAL
CODE § 2-713.
69. The New York Bar Association Committee on Consumer Affairs is presently
considering a proposal to codify the procedures outlined in this decree, but have
postponed final determination until such time as the results of the Brand Jewelers
Decree can be studied. Interview with David Paget, Chairman of the New York Bar
Association Committee on Consumer Affairs, by telephone, February 5, 1973.
70. It is safe to state that the toll which sewer service and the default judg-
ments and wage garnishments, which almost ineluctable follow in its wake,
exact, demonstrably include the loss of employment, increased personal in-
debtedness, personal bankruptcies, disruption and splintering of family life, the
fostering of fraudulent and predatory sales practices, the frustration and
hindrance of numerous Government programs designed to aid the urban
poor, the impairment of the integrity of the judicial system and an erosion in
respect for the rule of law.
Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law, United States v. Brand Jewelers, Inc., Civ. No. 70-170
(S.D.N.Y. 1969).
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Civil Rights-Standing to Sue Under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1968
In TraHicante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,' the first case
to construe standing under the enforcement sections of Title VIII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1968,2 the Supreme Court continued its recent trend
of liberalizing the standing-to-sue doctrine by extending to a wide
range of civil plaintiffs the right to challenge violations of the fair
housing law.' Paul Trafficante, a white man, and Dorothy Carr, a
black woman, were both tenants in a large San Francisco apartment
complex. Neither alleged that they were the primary victims of dis-
criminatory practices; instead, they claimed that their landlords, by
various means,4 had restricted the number of black tenants in the com-
plex to less than one percent of the total number of tenants' in violation
of section 804 of the Civil Rights Act of 1968.0 As a result, peti-
tioners Trafficante and Carr claimed to have felt the secondary effects
of discrimination in the form of lost social, business, and professional
relationships accruing from an integrated community and in the social
stigma and economic damage occasioned by being forced to live in a
"white ghetto."' 7
1. 93 S. Ct. 364 (1972).
2. Civil Rights Act of 1968, §§ 801-31, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-31 (1970).
3. A number of authors have examined this trend. E.g., Davis, The Liberalized
Law of Standing, 37 U. Cm. L. RFv. 450 (1970); Tucker, The Metamorphosis of the
Standing to Sue Doctrine, 17 N.Y.L.F. 911 (1972); Comment, Standing of Private
Parties to Vindicate the Public Interest, 50 B.U.L. REv. 417 (1970); Comment, The
Congressional Intent to Protect Test: A Judicial Lowering of the Standing Barrier, 41
U. CoLo. L. REv. 96 (1969).
4. Petitioners alleged, inter alia, that their landlord was "making it known to
them [the non-white rental applicants] that they would not be welcome at Parkmerced,
manipulating the waiting list for apartments, delaying action on their applications,
using discriminatory acceptance standards, and the like." 93 S. Ct. at 366.
5. Id. at n.5.
6. Civil Rights Act of 1968, § 804, 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1970), which provides
in relevant part:
[l]t shall be unlawful-
(a) To refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or
to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable
or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, or national
origin.
(b) To discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or
privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling. . . because of race, color, religion,
or national origin.
(d) To represent to any person because of race, color, religion, or na-
tional origin that any dwelling is not available for inspection, sale, or rental
when such dwelling in fact is so available.
7. 93 S. Ct. at 366.
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Pursuant to section 810 of the Civil Rights Act,' petitioners filed
complaints with the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HU) alleging discrimination. After failing to obtain satisfaction
from their landlords through the efforts of HUD, petitioners then filed
their complaints in the district court, which found that they were not
"persons aggrieved" within the meaning of section 810(a) in that they
were not the direct victims of the alleged discrimination. 9 The court
of appeals affirmed. 10 The Supreme Court reversed, granted standing,
and remanded the case to the district court for a hearing on the mer-
its." Mr. Justice Douglas, giving the opinion of the Court,'2 held
that "[w]e can give vitality to § 810(a) only by a generous construc-
tion which gives standing to sue to all in the same housing unit who
are injured by racial discrimination in the management of those facili-
ties under the auspices of HUD."' 3
The Supreme Court has in the past considered problems of stand-
ing as being governed by a "rule of self-restraint," apart from the "case
or controversy" limitation in Article H of the Constitution, because
of the practical problems inherent in significantly increasing the num-
ber of persons eligible to bring controversies before the court. 4 The
traditional test for standing required a showing of direct injury to a
legal interest, "one of property, one arising out of contract, one pro-
8. Civil Rights Act of 1968, § 810(a), 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a) (1970), which
provides in relevant part:
Any person who claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing
practice or who believes that he will be irrevocably injured by a discrimina-
tory housing practice that is about to occur (hereafter "person aggrieved")
may file a complaint with the Secretary [of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment].
The Civil Rights Act of 1968, § 812, 42 U.S.C. § 3612 (1970), also provides for
original jurisdiction in the federal courts without regard to the amount in controversy,
but does not require the complainant to file first with HUD.
9. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 322 F. Supp. 352 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
The court held further that any "enforcement of the public interest in fair housing"
should be accomplished by the Attorney General under the Civil Rights Act of 1968,
§ 813, 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (1970). The petitioners also claimed that their rights under
42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970) had been violated; this claim was rejected by the court as
being without merit. Id. at 353.
10. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 446 F.2d 1158 (9th Cir. 1971).
11. 93 S. Ct. at 368.
12. Mr. Justice White in a concurring opinion joined by two other Justices ex-
pressed his doubt that, absent the statute relied upon here, the petitioners could
otherwise present a "case or controversy" within the meaning of Article III of the
Constitution. Id.
13. Id. Because standing was granted under § 810 of the Civil Rights Act of
1968, the Court found it unnecessary to reach the question of standing under 42
U.S.C. § 1982 (1970). 93 S. Ct. at 367 n.8.
14. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953).
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tected against tortious invasion, or one founded on a statute which
confers such a privilege."'15 However, in at least one area, standing
to sue under a statute, this limited view of standing has gradually
been expanded, both by the Congress in drafting legislation and by the
judiciary in applying it.
Draftsmen have increasingly made use of "persons aggrieved"
provisions, such as the one involved in Trallicante,1 as a "statutory
aid" in conferring standing."7 The Supreme Court first construed
such a statute' 8 in FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station,'0 in which
a radio station challenged the grant of a license by the FCC to a com-
peting station, even though "under the Communications Act economic
injury to a competitor is not a ground for refusing a broadcasting
license .. ."20 However, the Court held:
Congress had some purpose in enacting § 402(b)(2).
It may have been of [the] opinion that one likely to be financially
injured by the issue of a license would be the only person having
a sufficient interest to bring to the attention of the appellate court
errors of law in the action of the Commission in granting the
license. It is within the power of Congress to confer such stand-
ing to prosecute an appeal.2 '
Even when Congress does not specifically provide for standing in
a statute, such standing may be inferred when the purpose of the stat-
ute is found to evidence an intent to prevent the type of injury sus-
tained by the complainant. In Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities Co.22 a
public utility alleged economic injury caused by expansion of the Ten-
nessee Valley Authority (TVA) into its service area in violation of the
Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933.28 Even though the statute
contained no express standing provision, 4 the Court found that the
15. Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 137-38 (1939) (private
power company alleged economic injury caused by TVA competition; standing de-
nied).
16. Civil Rights Act of 1968, § 810(a), 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a) (1970), quoted
note 8 supra. A similar provision was included in the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
§ 204, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3 (1970).
17. Comment, 50 B.U.L. RIv., .supra note 3, at 420.
18. Communications Act of 1934, § 402(b)(2), 47 U.S.C. § 402(b)(6) (1970).
19. 309 U.S. 470 (1940). The competitive interest was also protected in Scripps-
Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4 (1942); Philco Corp. v. FCC, 257 F.2d 656
(D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 946 (1959); Clarksburg Publishing Co. v.
FCC, 225 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
20. 309 U.S. at 472.
21. Id. at 477.
22. 390 U.S. 1 (1968).
23. 16 U.S.C. § 831n-4 (1970).
24. 390 U.S. at 7.
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Act was designed to protect private utilities from TVA competition,
and held that "when the particular statutory provision invoked does
reflect a legislative purpose to protect a competitive interest, the injured
competitor has standing to require compliance with that provision. ' 25
The Hardin test was later adopted and further refined in Associa-
tion of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp,26 in which
the statute construed did include a specific grant of standing. The
petitioners, sellers of data processing services, protested an action by
the Comptroller of the Currency granting to national banks the right
to make such services available to other banks and their customers.
They claimed standing under the Administrative Procedure Act, which
grants standing to any person "aggrieved by agency action within the
meaning of a relevant statute. '2 7  The Court held that a "person ag-
grieved" must meet two tests:2 the first, derived from Article 11 of
the Constitution, is "whether the plaintiff alleges that the challenged
action has caused him injury in fact, economic or otherwise";2" the
second is "whether the interest sought to be protected by the complain-
ant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated
by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question."3 0
The "injury in fact" test was explained two years later in Sierra
Club v. Morton,3 1 which required "that the party seeking review be
himself among the injured. '32  The Sierra Club alleged -that the De-
partment of the Interior had violated federal laws in allowing private
use of land preserved as national forest and claimed to be a person
aggrieved under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).13 Although
25. Id. at 6.
26. 397 U.S. 150, 155 (1970).
27. Administrative Procedure Act § 702, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
28. Although the Data Processing decision was nowhere cited in Trafficante v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., the two tests for standing that it established appear to be
the basis for the reasoning in Trafficante. See text accompanying notes 44-46 infra.
Its omission is curious in view of the Court's citation of two other cases involving
standing under the Administrative Procedure Act, Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727
(1972), and Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970).
29. 397 U.S. at 152.
30. Id. at 153. The "zone of interests" test was criticized in a concurring opin-
ion by Mr. Justice Brennan in Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970), as a
"wholly unnecessary and inappropriate second step upon the constitutional require-
ment for standing," which should affect reviewability rather than standing. Id. at 169;
see Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. Cm. L. REv. 450 (1970).
31. 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (4-3 decision).
32. Id. at 735. Dissenting opinions urged that an exception to this general rule
be made in environmental cases. Id. at 741-60; cf. Sedler, Standing to Assert Consti-
tutional Jus Tertii in the Supreme Court, 71 YA E L.J. 599 (1962).
33. Administrative Procedure Act § 702, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
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the Supreme Court recognized that the Club "is a large and long-es-
tablished organization, with an historic commitment to the cause of
protecting our Nation's natural heritage from man's depredations,"84
the Court denied standing because the Club had failed to allege any
injury to itself or its members: "[A] mere 'interest in a problem,' no
matter how longstanding the interest and no matter how qualified the
organization is in evaluating the problem, is not sufficient by itself
to render the organization 'adversely affected' or 'aggrieved' within
the meaning of the APA."' 5
However, the Court also indicated clearly that economic injuries
of the type alleged in the competitor's suits were not the only type of
injuries to be recognized: "Aesthetic and environmental well-being,
like economic well-being, are important ingredients of the quality of our
life in our society," and are no less[ "deserving of legal protection
through the judicial process." '86 The lower federal courts have granted
plaintiffs standing to assert a number of other noneconomic interests,
including the quality of radio and television programming" and the
treatment of persons displaced by urban renewal programs. 8 In Shan-
non v. HUD,"0 the Third Circuit acknowledged the right of residents
in a neighborhood chosen by HUD to become the site of a low-income
housing project to allege the adverse affect on "not only their invest-
ments in homes and businesses, but even the very quality of their
daily lives." 40
In Trafficante, petitioners alleged both economic and social in-
juries caused by being forced to live in a "white ghetto."'" The
Court refused to restrict the concept of "injury" to grant standing
only to those who had themselves been refused housing. Instead, it
reaffirmed the concept that the nature of the alleged injury is unim-
portant, so long as it is an injury that has in fact been sustained by
the complainant42 and that is sufficiently particular to meet the "case
or controversy" test in Article IMI of the Constitution.48
34. 405 U.S. at 739.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 734.
37. Office of Communications of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d
994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
38. Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968).
39. 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970).
40. Id. at 818.
41. 93 S. Ct. at 366.
42. Id. at 367; see text accompanying notes 31-40 supra.
43. 93 S. Ct. at 368; see Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968).
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Data Processing was nowhere mentioned in Trafficante; however,
the Data Processing "zone of interests" test 4 appears to be the occasion
for a finding by the Court that the "language of the Act is broad and
inclusive?""r and that the legislative history, albeit meager, would sup-
port a grant of standing to "those who were not the direct objects of
discrimination."4" Respondents argued, however, that in granting to
the Attorney General only the authority to seek an injunction to bar
a "pattern or practice" of discrimination,47 Congress intended that only
the Attorney General should have such power, which the petitioners
were allegedly attempting to usurp. This argument was rejected upon
a finding that, as a practical matter, the Attorney General with "less
than two dozen lawyers" in the Housing Section of the Civil Rights
division, was incapable of any effective, wide-ranging enforcement.48
Private suits are therefore necessary where "the complainants act not
only on their own behalf, but also 'as private attorneys general in
vindicating a policy that Congress considered to be of the highest
priority.' ,,49
The "private attorney general" concept 0 has been utilized in sit-
uations where the government may be unwilling or, as in Trafficante,
unable effectively to enforce a large number of violations of the law.51
In Allen v. State Board of Elections52 the Court dealt with a suit by
a private citizen alleging violation of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.8
As in Trafficante, the Attorney General was empowered to seek an in-
junction to halt violations, 54 but the Court recognized that because of
44. See text accompanying note 30 supra.
45. 93 S. CL at 367. Precisely which language is relied upon is not known;
however, the Court is apparently referring to the "person aggrieved" provision in
§ 810, quoted note 8 supra, and to the declaration of policy in § 801, which provides:
"It is the policy of the United States to provide, within constitutional limitations, for
fair housing throughout the United States." 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1970).
46. 93 S. Ct. at 367. The legislative history of the Act does not specifically dis-
cuss standing, but does lend some support to a finding that the Act was intended to
remedy a broad range of ills resulting from discriminatory housing practices. See
Hearings on S. 1358, & S. 2280 Before the Subcomm. on Housing & Urban Affairs of
the Senate Comm. on Banking & Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); 114 CoNG.
REc. 2706 (1968) (remarks of Senator Javits); 114 CoNG. REc. 3472 (1968) (remarks
of Senator Mondale); 114 CONG. REc. 9559 (1968) (remarks of Congressman Celler).
47. Civil Rights Act of 1968, § 813, 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (1970).
48. 93 S. Ct. at 367.
49. Id.
50. This phrase was first used in Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694,
704 (2d Cir. 1943), vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943).
51. See Tucker, supra note 3, at 939-40.
52. 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
53. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 to 1973p (1970).
54. Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 12(d), 42 U.S.C. § 1973j(d) (1970).
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the large number of potential violations, "[t]he achievement of the
Act's laudable goal would be severely hampered . . .if each citizen
were required to depend solely on litigation instituted at the discretion
of the Attorney General." 55
In Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc.," a private citizen had
successfully obtained an injunction under Tire II of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,57 which, like the statute in Trafficante, permitted the
Attorney General to initiate suits only to remedy "patterns or prac-
tices" of discrimination.58  The Court allowed full attorney's fees to
the petitioner, reasoning that to do otherwise would discourage suits
by aggrieved parties." The Court further observed:
When the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed, it was evi-
dent that enforcement would prove difficult and that the Nation
would have to rely in part upon private litigation as a means of
securing broad compliance with the law. A Title II suit is thus
private in form only. When a plaintiff brings an action under
that Title, he cannot recover damages. If he obtains an in-
junction, he does so not for himself alone but also as a "private
attorney general," vindicating a policy that Congress considered
of the highest priority. 60
Thus, the petitioners in Traflicante, once having met the dual Data
Processing tests,61 as refined by Sierra Club v. Morton,62 were granted
standing not only to seek a remedy for their own personal injuries, but
also to protect the interests of the public .
3
At the very least, then, Trafficante held that tenants in an apart-
ment complex who claim to have suffered social and economic in-
juries caused by specific acts of discrimination to others, which are
prohibited by section 804 of the Civil Rights Act, have standing under
Section 810 to complain of such discriminatory acts. How much fur-
ther the Supreme Court will travel in applying the Traflicante rationale
remains to be seen. The existence of the "person aggrieved" provi-
sion, the inability of the Attorney General adequately to police viola-
55. 393 U.S. at 556; see J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964); cf.
Perkins v. Mathews, 400 U.S. 379, 396 (1971).
56. 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (per curiam).
57. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 201-07, 42 U.S.C. H0 2000a to 2000a-6 (1970).
58. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 206, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-5 (1970).
59. 390 U.S. at 402.
60. Id. at 401-02.
61. See text accompanying notes 29-30 supra.
62. See text accompanying notes 31-40 supra.
63. See text accompanying notes 48-59 supra.
[Vol. 511536
STANDING TO SUE
tions, and the existence of an opinion letter from the Assistant Re-
gional Administrator of HUD, to which the Court attached "great
weight," 64 concluding that the petitioners were persons aggrieved under
the Act, are all factors supporting the Court's holding. But one can
only speculate whether any of these factors are vital as well as sup-
portive since the opinion simply lists each without weighing them in-
dividually. Will the patron of any hotel, restaurant, or movie theater
under Title 11 of the Civil Rights Act of 196465 now have standing
to allege exclusion of others because of "race, color, religion or na-
tional origin," 6 simply by alleging that he is socially stigmatized by
this exclusion and by presenting a favorable agency opinion letter?6 7
Although Trafficante might be distinguished in that tenants, once set-
tled, cannot as a practical matter as easily relocate as can the hotel,
restaurant, or theater patron, what if this is the only hotel or restaurant
in town? The 1964 Act does not make such subjective distinctions,
with the result that Trafficante would seem logically to support a grant
of standing to a "stigmatized patron." Such questions have already
been answered in the affirmative by the Equal Employment Opportu-
nities Commission in construing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.68 The Commission interpreted the Act as granting standing
to white employees to allege employer discrimination against minority
job applicants, finding that "an employee's legitimate interest in the
terms and conditions of his employment comprehends his right to work
in an atmosphere free of unlawful employment practices and their con-
sequences." '69 Trafficante would seem to bear out the Commission's
interpretation.
64. 93 S. Ct. at 367; see Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971);
United States v. City of Chicago, 400 U.S. 8, 10 (1970) (per curiam); Udall v. Tall-
man, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965). The finding in Trafficante is an example of how loosely
"administrative construction" can be defined. The only "construction" by HUD in
this case was a bare conclusion in a letter prepared after the complaint had already
been filed in district court.
65. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 201-07, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000a-6
(1970). The Act contains a "person aggrieved" provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3
(1970), and is sufficiently broad to make adequate enforcement by the Attorney Gen-
eral impossible. See Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402
(1968) (per euriam).
66. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (1970).
67. This suggests another aspect of the Trafficante holding that is implied by the
facts of the case rather than by the opinion itself: should the Trafficante rationale be
limited to allegations of racial discrimination? The broader language of the Civil
Rights Act of 1968, § 804, 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1970), suggests not. See also Peters v.
Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972) (opinion of White, J.).
68. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701-16, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1970).
69. Case Nos. NO 68-8-257E, NO 68-9-329E, 2 F.E.P. Cas. 79, 80 (EEOC 1969).
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CONCLUSION
While the Data Processing decision was not mentioned by the
Court in Trafficante, the dual tests there enumerated appear to be the
basis for the latter decision. The fact situation in Trafficante is yet
another area in which the Supreme Court has loosened its increasingly
flexible standing requirements by reaffirming that the nature of the in-
jury alleged is unimportant so long as it constitutes "injury in fact"
within the meaning of Article III of the Constitution. In cases like
Trafficante, standing is conferred not only to remedy individual in-
juries, but perhaps more importantly, to protect the interests of society
in obtaining fair and open housing.
The practical effects of Trafficante, however, are less certain. Al-
though it expanded the class of persons entitled to allege denial of fair
housing to include tenants, whether such an expansion will significantly
increase the number of suits brought in this area is doubtful. Although
a tenant may often be in a far better position to discover discrimina-
tion,70 in the past nothing has prevented such a determined tenant
from apprising potential minority applicants of this fact and encourag-
ing action on their part. While the tenant's task was concededly greater
before Trafficante, it was usually not an impossible one, as evidenced
by the Trafficante case itself: soon after Trafficante was denied stand-
ing in the district court, five rejected minority applicants to the apart-
ment complex filed suit. 71 Furthermore, in order to establish the nec-
essary violations of section 80472 at trial, the petitioners will probably
have to call as witnesses the very persons whom the respondents claim
are the only proper parties to bring the suit-the direct victims of the
discriminatory acts. The prevention of possible harassment to civil de-
fendants by unlimited access to the federal courts seems to be one
concern implicit in recent Supreme Court considerations of the "case
70. The petitioner argued:
Unlike the individual minority applicant, who typically has only a limited
awareness of or contact with his prospective landlord, residents have a contin-
uity of association and contact which uniquely enables them to observe and
discern both the racial character of their self-contained community and the
way in which that character is maintained. This is of substantial signifi-
cance, since a large apartment complex can easily conceal its discriminatory
policies so that it is impossible for a minority applicant to determine with
any certainty that he has been the victim of racial discrimination.
Brief for Petitioner at 38, Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 93 S. Ct. 364
(1972).
71. Burbridge v. Parkmerced Corp., No. C-71-378[AJZ] (N.D. Cal., filed Feb.
25, 1971) (filed fifteen days after the district court decision in Trafficante v. Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co., 322 F. Supp. 352 (N.D. Cal. 1971) ).
72. Relevant parts of § 804 are quoted note 6 supra.
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or controversy" requirement in Article M of the Constitution. 73 Thus,
rather than significantly increasing the volume of litigation, Trai i-
cante's promise of merely allowing tenants to do directly what they
had previously been required to do indirectly may be one of the more
persuasive, if as yet unarticulated, factors encouraging the Court to ex-
tend the Trafficante rationale to analogous situations.
DOUGLAS K. COOPER
Constitutional Law-The Eighth Amendment
and Prison Reform
The conditions within many American prisons have made the pe-
nal system a national disgrace. From time to time crisis situations have
erupted, and the public has been made aware of the desperate need for
reform of the practices and conditions of confinement of prison inmates.
In the past several years the courts, and especially the lower federal
courts, have begun to take a more active role in ameliorating abject
prison conditions. The primary constitutional theory underlying these
suits has been the eighth amendment prohibition against the inflic-
tion of cruel and unusual punishment.' Two recent cases, Baker v.
Hamilton2 and Inmates of Boys' Training School v. Affleck, 3 have em-
phasized the importance of social rehabilitation in finding the condi-
tions of juvenile confinement unlawful. These cases suggest that in the
future the eighth amendment might serve as the constitutional founda-
tion for the precept that lawful confinement of adults as well as juve-
niles requires rehabilitative services. Although this possibility seems
unlikely at the present time, the trend in the eighth amendment cases
does provide a potential avenue for courts to follow if the essential pur-
pose of the criminal justice system were to be changed from punish-
ment to reformation. This note will discuss the evolution of the eighth
73. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739-40 (1972); Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186, 204-08 (1962).
1. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
2. 345 F. Supp. 345 (W.D. Ky. 1972).
3. 346 F. Supp. 1354 (D.R.I. 1972).
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amendment as a device for prison reform4 and will suggest that reha-
biliation for the prisoner should be a right.
The text of the eighth amendment of the Constitution was taken
from the English Bill of Rights of 1689.1 The original purpose of
the article was to eliminate the executions and tortures practiced by
the Stuart monarchy. It was incorporated into the United States Consti-
tution in 1791 after being adopted in nine colonial constitutions.0 Ini-
tially and throughout the nineteenth century, 7 the amendment was in-
terpreted to prohibit extreme forms of corporal punishment. The Su-
preme Court in In re Kemmlers found certain punishments to be man-
ifestly cruel and unusual. Among these were crucifixion, burning on
the stake, and breaking on the wheel. A significant change in inter-
pretation came in 1910 with Weems v. United States.10 In that case
the Supreme Court forbade infliction of cadena temporal," a Spanish ver-
sion of hard labor, upon a man convicted in the Philippines of falsify-
ing entries in government records because the punishment was out of
all proportion to the seriousness of the crime. The term of punishment
was fifteen years. The Supreme Court held this statutory penalty un-
constitutional under the Philippine bill of rights, which contained a
prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishment."'1 2  Weems ex-
pressly recognized that this concept is flexible and responsive to social
norms.'
3
Several other tests for determining whether a particular punish-
ment is cruel and unusual have been suggested since the Weems deci-
sion. By far the more frequently recognized standard is to inquire
whether the penalty administered "shocks the general conscience of
4. For a thorough treatment of the historical development of the "cruel and
unusual" prohibition see Note, The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and the
Substantive Criminal Law, 79 HRv. L. REv. 635 (1966).
5. "That excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted." 1. W. & M. 2, c.2, § 10.
6. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The Original
Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. Rv. 839, 840 (1969).
7. See, e.g., Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1878).
8. 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
9. Id. at 446-47.
10. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
11. Id. at 364.
12. Id. at 365, 367-68.
13. The majority stated that "it is a precept of justice that punishment for crime
should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense," id. at 367, while also noting,
'The clause of the Constitution . . . is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire
meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice." Id. at 378.
It should be noted that the former notion of proportionality first appeared in the dis-
sent to O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 340 (1892).
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civilized society."' 14 Another measurement, proposed by Justice Gold-
berg in Rudolph v. Alabama,'5 would gauge the relationship between
the punishment inflicted and the penal aim sought to be achieved.' 6
In Trop v. Dulles'7 Chief Justice Warren noted that the eighth amend-
ment was not static and that "[t]he Amendment must draw its meaning
from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society."' 8 These standards are at once vague and flexible.
Historically, the judiciary has been reluctant to involve itself in the
operation of the correctional system on either the state or the federal
level. The courts largely appear to believe that they have satisfied
their responsibilities under the law once a decision has been rendered.
Several reasons have been offered to support this "hands off" policy.19
One prevalent explanation is based on the principle of the separation
of powers:
[I]nasmuch as Congress has placed control of the federal prison sys-
tem under the Attorney General, and inasmuch as the control of a
state prison system is vested in the Governor or his delegated rep-
resentative, a federal court is powerless to intervene in the inter-
nal administration of this executive function even to protect prison-
ers from the deprivation of their constitutional rights.20
Another explanation is that the courts lack expertise in the field of
penology and feel that they should leave corrections to knowledgeable
prison administrators. Finally, the reluctance to become involved is
sometimes explained by a fear that intervention will subvert internal
prison discipline and therefore harm the criminal justice system.21
Slowly jurists have begun to realize that the courts and the pri-
sons are components in a continuous system of administration of jus-
tice and that the court's responsibility continues beyond sentencing.
Courts have found that prison regulations should not always supersede
14. E.g., Williams v. Field, 416 F.2d 483, 486 (9th Cir. 1969); Lee v. Tahash,
352 F.2d 970, 972 (8th Cir. 1965).
15. 375 U.S. 889, 891 (1963) (Goldberg, J., dissenting); accord, Jordan v. Fitz-
harris, 257 F. Supp. 674, 679 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
16. The Court in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962), held that
imprisonment for the crime of "being" a drug addict was cruel and unusual.
17. 356 U.S. 86 (1957).
18. Id. at 101.
19. For the origin of this denomination see Comment, Beyond the Ken of the
Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE
LJ. 506 n.4 (1963).
20. Comment, The Inadequacy of Prisoners' Rights to Provide Sufficient Pro-
tection for Those Confined in Penal Institutions, 48 N.C.L. Ray. 847, 849 n.8 (1970).
21. See, e.g., Bethea v. Crouse, 417 F.2d 504, 505-06 (10th Cir. 1969).
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the personal rights of the convict. 22 Consequently, the Supreme Court
in Johnson v. Avery23 rejected the "hands off" policy in 1969. The
abject conditions existing in the prisons and the mounting pressures
for prison reform have led to this result.
Before reaching the question of the prisoner's right to rehabili-
tation it is important to examine the current eighth amendment cases
that have found the daily living conditions within prisons to be
"cruel and unusual." The most significant recent decision in this
field is Holt v. Sarver,2 4 in which the conditions at the Arkansas state
prison farms were found to violate the eighth amendment. In that
case the use of severely crowded open barracks, isolation cells, the
trusty guard system 25 and corporal punishment, the lack of supervision,
and the existence of unrestrained inmate brutality combined to make
the operation of the state system cruel and unusual.26
The Holt court approached the problems of the Arkansas prisons
in a comprehensive fashion. First, the court viewed the dictates of the
eighth amendment as applying to the rights of the prison population
as a whole and not solely to the treatment of one specific inmate.2 7
Secondly, the general living conditions in the facilities, rather than any
one practice of the administrators, were determined to constitute
cruel and unusual punishment. Thirdly, the test of unlawful incarcer-
ation required the objectionable conduct to be "confinement. . .char-
22. The court in Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944), cert.
denied, 225 U.S. 887 (1945), stated, "A prisoner retains all of the rights of an ordinary
citizen except those expressly, or by necessary implication, taken from him by law.
While the law does take his liberty and imposes a duty of servitude and observance
of discipline for his regulation and that of other prisoners, it does not deny his right
to personal security against unlawful invasion."
23. 393 U.S. 483, 486 (1969).
24. 309 F. Supp. 362 (D. Ark. 1970), afj'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1970).
But cf. Wilson v. Kelley, 294 F. Supp. 1005 (N.D. Ga. 1968), afj'd, 393 U.S. 266
(1968) (per curiam). Wilson found that work camps per se did not constitute cruel
and unusual punishment. The important decision of Robinson v. California, 370
U.S. 660 (1962), incorporated the eighth amendment through the fourteenth amend-
ment and made it applicable to the states.
25. The use of a particular trusty guard system was also found violative of the
eighth amendment in Roberts v. Williams, 456 F.2d 819, 828 (5th Cir. 1971). Contra,
George v. Sowers, 268 So. 2d 65 (La. App. 1972).
26. 309 F. Supp. at 372-82.
27. It appears to the Court, however, that the concept of "cruel and un-
usual punishment" is not limited to instances in which a particular inmate is
subjected to a punishment directed at him as an individual. In the Court's es-
timation confinement itself within a given institution may amount to cruel
and unusual punishment prohibited by the Constitution where the confinement
is characterized by conditions and practices so bad as to be shocking to the
conscience of reasonably civilized people even though a particular inmate




acterized by conditions and practices so bad as to be shocking to the
conscience of reasonably civilized people . *."..28 That standard was
recognized as changeable but would "broaden as society tends to pay
more regard to human decency and dignity and becomes, or likes to
think that it becomes, more humane." 29 Fourthly, the court adopted a
continuing role in the supervision of the state penal institutions. Af-
ter declaring that conditions in the Arkansas prison system constituted
cruel and unusual punishment, the court ordered the state to improve
the physical conditions and the supervisory practices at each work
camp. The court specified that the Commissioner of Corrections was to
submit a plan to ameliorate conditions and added what it considered to
be minimal guidelines for operating prison facilities. As a sanction for
noncompliance with the order, the court threatened to enjoin the use
of the two work farms altogether. In addition, the court was to moni-
tor the progress on a continuing basis by requiring periodic reports of
prison conditions. Finally, recognizing both the financial burden of
effecting such an extensive modification and the reluctance of the ex-
ecutive branch to appropriate funds, the court placed ultimate respon-
sibility for change on the Commissioner of Corrections.30 Obviously the
Holt court viewed the absolute "hands off" policy as obsolete.
A year after the Holt decision an Ohio court encountered a similar
situation in Jones v. Wittenberg.31 The inmates of the Lucas County
Jail, as a class, brought a federal civil rights action 2 alleging that se-
vere overcrowding of the facility, inadequate sanitary conditions, poor
interior lighting, inferior food and medical services, and improper cus-
todial supervision had subjected them to cruel and unusual punish-
ment. The district court agreed and found conditions constitutionally
unacceptable.3 3 In his subsequent order the trial judge listed the spe-
cific conditions to be improved and set the time within which the re-
medial action was to be taken.3" The major difficulty confronting the
28. Id.
29. Id. at 380.
30. Let there be no mistake in the matter; the obligation of the Respondents
to eliminate existing unconstitutionalities does not depend upon what the Leg-
islature may do, or upon what the Governor may do, or, indeed, upon what
Respondents may actually be able to accomplish. If Arkansas is going to
operate a Penitentiary System, it is going to have to be a system that is counte-
nanced by the Constitution of the United States.
Id. at 385.
31. 323 F. Supp. 93 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
32. Id. Most actions are brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1970).
33. 323 F. Supp. at 99.
34. The size of the jail population, the interior lighting, the number and quality
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court was to determine the source of funds for the project. Aware
that the judiciary has no inherent power of taxation, the court ordered
the sheriff and other officials to reallocate their budgeted funds to
effect the enumerated rehabilitative changes.Yr The court was to re-
tain continuing jurisdiction over the matter so that "the changes of
methods and practices required will not be abandoned, forgotten, or
neglected, but [will] become permanently established." 30
In Hamilton v. Schiro17 the prisoners of Orleans Parish Prison se-
cured an injunction forbidding the operation of the prison facility. The
living conditions within the institution were so inhumane and physically
dangerous that the court, rather than attempt to fashion relief to re-
form the prison, enjoined its use altogether. The trial judge concluded
his opinion tersely:
Prison life inevitably involves some deprivation of rights, but
the conditions of the plaintiff's confinement in Orleans Parish Pri-
son so shock the conscience as a matter of elemental decency and
are so much more cruel than is necessary to achieve a legitimate
penal aim that such confinement constitutes cruel and unusual pun-
ishment .... 88
The destructive conditions of inhumane prison confinement were
comprehensively assessed in Gates v. Collier. 9 In that case, brought by
the prisoners at the Mississippi State Prison at Parchman as a class ac-
tion,40 the court found conditions to be unlawful under state law41 as
well as under the eighth amendment. The opinion granted injunctive
and declaratory relief to the plaintiffs. The cruel and unusual punish-
of guards and other personnel, diet and food service, sanitation and personal hygiene,
medical treatment, communications with visitors and attorneys, and available reading
material were all included in special parts of the court order. Jones v. Wittenberg,
330 F. Supp. 707, 714-20 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
35. Id. at 713.
36. Id. at 721.
37. 338 F. Supp. 1016 (E.D. La. 1970). In addition, the court determined that
suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 did not require the exhaustion of available state reme-
dies as a necessary condition precedent to federal court action. Id. at 1019; accord,
Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
38. 338 F. Supp. at 1019. In the court's "Findings of Fact," the adverse condi-
tions of the prison were enumerated. It was noted that there were 900 prisoners in the
space built for 400, that six to eight inmates inhabited a cell 13 feet by 8.5 feet by 7.5
feet in size, that sanitation facilities were inoperable, mattresses were never cleaned,
exercise was only permitted once in twenty or thirty days, and that the kitchen,
sanitation, and shower system were infested with rats, mice, and roaches. Id. at
1016-18.
39. 349 F. Supp. 881 (N.D. Miss. 1972).
40. The prisoners at Parchman brought suit under 42 U.S.C. H9 1981, 1983, 1985,
1994 (1970).
41. MIss. CoDE ANN. H9 7930, 7942, 7959, 7968 (Supp. 1971).
[Vol. 511544
PRISON REFORM
ment found in Gates was composed of two parts: the deleterious ef-
fects of inhumane living conditions and the danger of prisoner mistreat-
ment by armed trusty guards and other inmates. 42  The court care-
fully noted that public and official apathy regarding the state of incar-
cerated prisoners was a cause of the deficiencies at Parchman. 48 Basing
its authority to act on the need to protect the constitutional rights of the
prisoners, the court specifically set out the physical and administra-
tive improvements required to meet constitutional standards and es-
tablished the time in which to make them.44  In addition, the order re-
quired prompt submission of a comprehensive plan for the guidance of
future improvements.45 The court was to retain jurisdiction over the
project indefintely. Fortunately for the Gates court, the matter of
funding was not a serious problem because of the immediate availability
of federal assistance.46
Judge Keady in the Gates case expressed what had been an implic-
it development in the previous cases when he recognized that prison-
ers have a constitutional right to "adequate provision for their physical
health and well-being . . . . 4 The eighth amendment prohibition had
traditionally been interpreted as forbidding certain intolerable prac-
tices. But imprisonment generally was not considered to be a pro-
scribed punishment. The courts in the cases surveyed have had little
difficulty in drawing the analogy between objectionable physical pun-
ishment and inhumane imprisonment conditions. The application of
the cruel and unusual punishment standard in each case has established
minimal requirements for lawful confinement. But surprisingly, the
42. The problem of inhumane living conditions was described in the court's
findings in these terms: "The housing units at Parchman are unfit for human habita-
tion under any modem concept of decency. The facilities at all camps for the dis-
posal of human and other waste are shockingly inadequate and present an immediate
health hazard." 349 F. Supp. at 887. As to the competency of the trusty guards the
court stated, "Penitentiary records indicate that many of the armed trusties have
been convicted of violent crimes, and that of the armed trusties serving as of April 1,
1971, 35% had not been psychologically tested, 40% of those tested were found to be
retarded, and 71% of those tested were found to have personality disorders." Id. at
889.
43. Id. at 888.
44. Id. at 898-903.
45. Id. at 903-04.
46. The notoriety of the case had attracted sufficient federal interest to warrant a
commitment to the Parchman prison of one million dollars by the Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration of the United States Department of Justice. Id. at 892.
47. Id. at 894. This has been recognized previously by courts but apparently
never utilized to guarantee prison rights. "The obligation of a State to treat its con-
victs with decency and humanity is an absolute one and a federal court will not over-
look a breach of that duty." Johnson v. Dye, 175 F.2d 250, 256 (3d Cir. 1949),
rev'd per curiam on other grounds, 338 U.S. 864 (1949).
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historically vague constitutional prohibition has been used to secure
extremely specific levels of decency for the treatment of convicts. Fur-
thermore, the eighth amendment cases have delineated affirmative rights
for prisoners.48
On the perimeter of the evolving eighth amendment theory of pris-
oner rights is the question of whether the denial of rehabilitative activ-
ities constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. This problem has not
been squarely faced although several courts have placed vocational
training among those factors to be considered in determining the con-
stitutionality of prison conditions. 49  But no court, as yet, has invalidated
a penal system solely because of the absence of rehabilitative pro-
grams. 50
However, the lack of social rehabilitative programs was an impor-
tant factor in two recent cases concerning juveniles. In Inmates of Boys'
Training School v. Affleck 5' officials had transferred "problem" inmates
from the Boys Home to maximum and medium security adult prison
facilities and occasionally to the solitary confinement cells located there.
The court enjoined the use of the adult prison for the non-criminal ju-
venile population of the Home. The opinion stressed the purpose of ju-
venile confinement, which under Rhode Island law is "instruction and
reformation. 52 Because rehabilitation was the reason for confinement
48. A common issue in many eighth amendment cases is the adequacy of medical
care. There has been a proliferation of cases finding that denial of medical care to in-
dividual prisoners violates the eighth amendment. See United States v. Fitzgerald,
466 F.2d 377, 380 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Newman v. Alabama, 349 F. Supp. 278, 280-81
(M.D. Ala. 1972); Lopez-Tijerina v. Ciccone, 324 F. Supp. 1265, 1268 (W.D. Mo.
1971); Owens v. Alldridge, 311 F. Supp. 667, 669 (W.D. Okla. 1970); Ramsey v.
Ciccone, 310 F. Supp. 600, 605 (W.D. Mo. 1970).
49. Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93, 97 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
50. Even the court in Holt v. Sarver refused to go that far:
This Court knows that a sociological theory or idea may ripen into
constitutional law; many such theories and ideas have done so. But, this
Court is not prepared to say that such a ripening has occurred as yet as far
as rehabilitation of convicts is concerned. Given an otherwise unexceptional
penal institution, the Court is not willing to hold that confinement in it is
unconstitutional simply because the institution does not operate a school, or
provide vocational training, or other rehabilitative facilities and services
which many institutions now offer.
309 F. Supp. at 379.
51. 346 F. Supp. 1354 (D.R.I. 1972). None of the youths in the Boys' Training
School had been adjudicated as criminals. They comprised five classifications: 1) those
committed by their parents, 2) those awaiting trial, 3) those convicted of delin-
quency, 4) those found to be wayward, and 5) those determined to be neglected or
dependent. Id. at 1369.
52. R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 13-4-1, -13, -15 (1956). Also the court noted that
"Etihe Rhode Island legislature, in establishing its juvenile justice system, has spe-
cifically directed that it have rehabilitative, nonpenal, goals." 346 F. Supp. at 1364.
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of juveniles, the court concluded that the conditions constituting cruel
and unusual punishment need not be as grave as those found in the
prior adult criminal imprisonment cases. The court in Affleck deter-
mined that the mixing of juveniles with the adult prison population was
especially destructive of any attempt at reform. While access to read-
ing matter, fresh air and exercise, educational and vocational training,
outside visitors, and recreational diversion were all mentioned as being
vital to the development of the youths, the court primarily based its de-
cision on placing the youths in the same areas with the criminal adults.
Although the eighth amendment was used to protect detained juveniles
from the harshness of the physical conditions present in the criminal
justice system, the court did not find an explicit right to those services
and amenities thought necessary for effective rehabilitation.
Baker v. Hamilton's held that the selective confinement of juve-
niles within the criminal county jail for "shock value '54 did in fact con-
stitute cruel and unusual punishment. Citing the dilapidated physical
condition of the jail, the lack of exercise and recreation, and the ab-
sence of any rehabilitative value in jail confinement, the court ordered
the referral practice to cease. Once again, the fact that the county
jail "is a penal institute designed primarily for punishment rather than
rehabilitation"' 5 weighed heavily. Baker did not provide a well-de-
fined test for measuring impermissible confinement conditions for juve-
niles, but it did note that the severity of circumstances need not be as
dire as those necessary for court action in an adult case.
The application of the eighth amendment in both of these juve-
nile confinement situations was closely limited to the physical condi-
tions of the holding facility. Although rehabilitation was not required
by the dictates of the Constitution, it was explicitly recognized as a
duty by state statute.56 These cases have underscored the judicial aware-
ness of the importance of rehabilitation as the primary objective of
the juvenile reformative process. This recognition reflects the accept-
53. 345 F. Supp. 435 (W.D. Ky. 1972).
54. Id. at 349.
55. Id. at 352. The fact that non-criminal juveniles were being placed into con-
tact with hardened adult offenders was considered especially counter-rehabilitative
since the juveniles, in the opinion of an expert witness, seek to identify with the older
inmates and would learn the criminal trade. Id. at 348. In Martarella. v. Kelley,
349 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), the court solely based its decision to force the
closing of the Manida youth facility on the grounds that the institution presented a
physical danger to its inhabitants. Rehabilitative treatment of the juveniles was not
mentioned. Id. at 597.
56. 346 F. Supp. at 1367; 345 F. Supp. at 351.
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ance of the theories of child psychologists and sociologistsT and serves
as a repudiation of the concept of penal juvenile confinement. Unfor-
tunately, theoreticians for adult treatment have not met such a favorable
response.
Modem penologists58 have recognized social retraining of the
adult criminal as the ultimate objective of the prison system and have
discarded prior notions of deterrence, retribution, and isolation as the
fundamental purposes for confining inmates. The changing emphasis
views the prison as a place of correction rather than punishment-one
which administers treatment instead of inflicting revenge. 9 Many re-
habilitative theories are currently being discussed but few, if any, have
been empirically examined.60 Consequently, there is no unanimity in
approaching the task of reforming the American criminal. Every scheme
hopes to return the inmate to society as a well-adjusted and productive
individual who will not subsequently re-enter prison. Spiraling crime
rates61 and staggering prisoner recidivism6 2 have made the public and
correctional officials painfully aware that the existing retributive sys-
tem of punishment is not properly serving society." Although pop-
ular opinion acknowledges the logic of attempting to reform crimi-
nals, no effective citizen's movement has yet mobilized to attack the
problem and lobby for change. Extensive inmate rehabilitation pro-
57. Gough, The Beyond-Control Child and the Right to Treatment: An Exercise
in the Synthesis of Paradox, 16 ST. Louis L.J. 182 (1971); Note, Non-Delinquent
Children in New York: The Need for Alternatives to Institutional Treatment, 8
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROB. 251 (1972).
58. E.g., R. CLARK, CRIME IN AMERICA 220 (1970); CONTEMPORARY PUNISH-
MENT: VIEWS, EXPLANATIONS, AND JUSTIFICATIONS 175-227 (R. Gerber & P. McAn-
any eds. 1972); J. MARTIN & D. WEBSTER, SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION
216-223 (1971); Leopold, What's Wrong With the Prison System, 45 NED. L. REV.
33 (1966).
59. "Ihe function of punishment must accordingly be directed to its social pur-
pose .... [Ilt is the future and not the past, not the crime committed, that sets the
goal and the purpose sought." R. SALEELLES, THE INDIVIDUALIZATION OF PUNISHMENT
9 (1913).
60. One novel proposal combines the economic incentive of self-interest with
prisoner reform. This amalgam of social work and business principles rewards so-
cially desirable behavior with credits towards an early release. See Williams & Fish,
Rehabilitation and Economic Self-Interest, 17 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 406 (1971).
61. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 22-31 (1967).
62. R. CLARK, supra note 56, at 215; N. MoRRIs, THE HABIrruAL CRIMINAL 1-29
(1951); Robison & Smith, Effectiveness of Correctional Programs, 17 CRIME & DE-
LINQUENCY 67 (1971).
63. MODEL PENAL CODE § 102(c) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). For a list
of states recognizing the reformatory purpose of punishment see Singer, Bringing the
Constitution to Prison: Substantive Due Process and the Eighth Amendment, 39 U.
CNr. L. REV. 650, 676 n.136 (1970).
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grams would demand significant amounts of public funds. At present
popular commitment to prison reform has not yet guaranteed humane
living conditions, so there is no reason to believe that rehabilitation
would be more favorably received.
Until now the eighth amendment has been used to forbid brutal
forms of punishment and incarceration under abusive conditions. In
order to establish rehabilitation as a protected right, confinement for
purposes other than rehabilitation, even under decent conditions, must
be declared "cruel and unusual." Such a step would represent a funda-
mental modification in the conventional view of the role of institution-
alized punishment. The prior developments in eighth amendment
theory have not necessitated elemental alterations in the criminal
justice system. They have only accomplished reform by forcing the
system to operate in the manner in which it was originally intended, yet
without excessive cruelty. As such, these cases presented limited is-
sues for the courts to deal with. State and federal statutes would un-
doubtedly be necessary to establish rehabilitation as the acknowledged
purpose of the correctional system. If they were enacted, the court's
primary concern would be the proper administration of the statutory ob-
jectives. With this statutory foundation, the judiciary might use the
eighth amendment to secure rehabilitative treatment as a right. Sec-
ondarily, the constitutional principle might also establish rehabilitation
as the paramount purpose of a criminal justice system in a recalcitrant
jurisdiction. Here the amendment could be utilized to instigate change
rather than to enforce stated goals. As long as society determines
that punitive incarceration is a tolerable and desirable manner in which
to manage the problems posed by criminal offenders, the eighth
amendment will do little to provide for rehabilitation. The amend-
ment's application merely reflects existing social notions of decency
towards prisoners. Only when the public replaces the presently held
penal objectives with the reformative purposes proposed by penologists
will an affirmative role for the amendment exist.
The eighth amendment is currently being used to secure the right
to humane living conditions for prisoners in various parts of the country.
Whether public sensibilities will become enlightened to the point
where the reformative nature of corrections is recognized remains a mat-
ter for conjecture. In any case, the courts have shown themselves to
be ill-equipped for the task of managing and upgrading the American
prison system. One major impediment is the lack of funds. Because
of the separation of powers, the judiciary has limited authority to corn-
1973] 1549
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
pel the executive to increase the funding allotment for the penal system.
To a large degree, the effectiveness of judicial intervention in the area
of prison reform is circumscribed by the courts' inability to marshall
financial commitments for that purpose. But the major difficulty con-
fronting the courts and those who envision social rehabilitation as a
constitutional right lies in changing the public conceptualization of the
penal system. The eighth amendment can only reflect the normative
values of the American people. The future of the eighth amendment
rests not so much with thoughtful jurists but rather with an informed
and concerned public.
RONALD H. ROSENBERG
Constitutional Law-Evidence-Testimonial Reprieve for News-
men in Civil Litigation
Until recently newsmen appeared to be fighting a losing battle to
obtain a privilege to withhold confidential sources and information in
legal proceedings. By mid-1972 only eighteen states had statutes
granting an evidentiary privilege to newsmen,' and the Supreme Court
had decided in Branzburg v. Hayes' that newsmen enjoy no first
amendment right to withhold information from grand juries. After
Branzburg, several newsmen who refused to divulge their sources were
held in contempt, and a few journalists3 were jailed.4 Several news-
1. A. A. CODE tit. 7, § 370 (1960); ALAsKA STAT. §§ 09.25.150, 09.25.160(Supp. 1970); Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (Supp. 1970); ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 43-917 (1964); CAL. EviD. CODE ANN. § 1070 (West, 1966); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 51,
§§ 111-19 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972); IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-1733 (1968); Ky. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (1969); LA. REV. STAT. §§ 45:1451-54 (Supp. 1970); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 35, § 2 (1971); MicH. STAT. ANN. § 28.945(10) (1954); MoNT.
Rnv. CODES ANN. §§ 93-601 to -602 (1964); NEV. REv. STAT. § 49.275 (1969); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 2A-84A-21,29 (Supp. 1969); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-12.1 (Supp. 1970);
N.Y. Civ. RiGnTs LAw § 79-h (McKinney Supp. 1970); Omo REv. CODE ANN. §
2739.12 (Page 1953); PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 28, § 330 (Supp. 1970).
2. 408 U.S. 665 (1972), reporting the disposition of three cases: Branzburg v.
Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky.), cert. granted sub nom. Branzburg v. Hayes, 402 U.S.
942 (1971); In re Pappas, 358 Mass. 614, 266 N.E.2d 297, cert. granted, 402 U.S.
942 (1971); and Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), cert.
granted, 402 U.S. 942 (1971).
3. Throughout this note, "journalist" appears interchangeably with the terms
"newsman" and "reporter." The term "newsman" encompasses persons involved in
all phases of journalism, including news reporting and editing. Whether a privilege
should extend also to college newspaper reporters and editors or to authors of current
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men still face subpoenas and possible imprisonment. 5 Yet despite
Branzburg, or perhaps in reaction against that decision, the tide seems
to have shifted in recent months. Federal, state, and local officials is-
sued relatively fewer subpoenas in the latter part of 1972 and in the
beginning of 1973.8 Furthermore, approximately fifty-eight bills call-
ing for some type of evidentiary privilege for newsmen have been in-
troduced in Congress during the current session.7 Since Branzburg,
books, for example, is a hotly debated question. The extent of a reportorial privilege,
however, is an issue beyond the scope of this note.
4. N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1973, at 38, col. 5; id., Feb. 22, 1973, at 10, col. 4.
Peter Bridge was held in contempt of court and jailed for 20 days for refusing to
disclose confidential information relating to a story about official corruption that ap-
peared in the Newark Evening News; Edwin Goodwin received a 30-day sentence,
of which he served 44 hours, for refusing to deliver WBAI-FM tapes of a prison riot;
William Farr spent 46 days in jail for refusing to disclose his source for a Los Angeles
Times article about the Charles Manson murder trial. See, e.g., NEWSWEEK, Oct. 16,
1972, at 60; TmE, Jan. 1, 1973, at 44; N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1973, at 46, cols. 5-7;
id., Feb. 8, 1973, at 19, col. 1.
John Lawrence, Washington bureau chief for the Los Angeles Times, was jailed
briefly (2 hours) after his initial refusal to release recordings of an interview with a
key figure in the Watergate bugging case. The contempt citation and the jail sentence
ended when the source of the interview agreed not to bind the Times to its promise of
confidentiality and when the newspaper consequently handed over the tapes to the
court. NEwswEEK, Jan. 1, 1973, at 58; TME, Jan. 1, 1973, at 44; N.Y. Times, Dec.
22, 1973, at 1, cols. 1-3.
5. Among these reporters are Caldwell, Pappas, and Branzburg. No effort has
yet been made to recall either Caldwell or Pappas before grand juries; but Branzburg is
under a state six-month contempt sentence and refuses to return to Kentucky. He cur-
rently works for the Detroit Free Press. Governor Wendell Ford of Kentucky has
moved to extradite him from Michigan. TImE, Oct. 16, 1972, at 44; Hume, A
Chilling Effect on the Press, N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1972, § 6 (Magazine), at 79.
Other possible contempt proceedings confront South Carolina newsmen who were
subpoenaed to testify about a story on misconduct by officials and guardians at a
local detention center. Hume, supra at 82.
In Memphis, Tennessee, a reporter faces a contempt charge by a state legislative
subcommittee for refusing to disclose the source of an article about the abuses of a
state-operated home for retarded children. NEwSWEEK, Oct. 16, 1972, at 60; Hume,
supra at 82.
6. Tm NEw REPUBLic, Feb. 24, 1973, at 6.
7. S.J. Res. 8, S. 36, S. 158, S. 318, S. 451, S. 637, S. 750, S. 870, S. 917, S. 1128,
93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 717, H.R. 1263, H.R. 1735, H.R. 1794, H.R. 1813,
H.R. 1818, H.RIL 1819, H.R. 1985, H.R. 2002, H.R. 2015, H.R. 2101, H.R. 2187, H.R.
2200, H.R. 2230, H.R. 2231, H.RL 2232, H.R. 2233, H.R. 2234, H.R. 2433, H.R. 2563,
H.R. 2584, H.R. 2651, H.RL 3143, H.R. 3181, H.R. 3369, H.R. 3460, H.R. 3482,
H.R. 3520, H.R. 3595, HI. 3725, H.R. 3741, H.R. 3811, H.R. 3964, H.R. 3975,
H.R. 4020, H.R. 4035, H.R. 4135, H.R. 4275, H.R. 4383, H.R. 4423, H.R. 4456,
H.R. 4749, H.R. 5060, H.R. 5167, H.R. 5194, H.R1 5198, H.R. 5227, H.R. 5317, 93rd
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
Bills range from those calling for absolute protection to those suggesting a
qualified newsman's privilege. Many bills list crimes involving foreign aggression or
threat to life as areas in which the newsman's immunity should not apply. A critical
point of difference is also whether or not Congress should pre-empt state laws on
newsmen's privilege. See, N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1973, at 5, col. 1.
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two states have passed "shield" laws for newsmen,8 most of the re-
maining states are pressing for similar legislation,9 and the Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws are working on a model law to protect
newsmen.
10
Lower courts may also choose to limit the application of Branz-
burg, as demonstrated by the Second Circuit in Baker v. F & F Invest-
ment,11 which declined to extend the Branzburg rule to civil cases.
The court recognized a newsman's first amendment right to withhold
from discovery the identity of confidential news sources in limited cir-
cumstances. This note will examine Baker in the context of prior law
on testimonial privilege for newsmen and will weigh its significance as
one of the first circuit court decisions clearly to recognize a first amend-
ment claim to a reportorial privilege. 12
Unlike many reporters who have faced grand jury subpoenas,
journalist Alfred Balk in Baker faced demands for disclosure of con-
fidential sources in civil litigation. In a federal class action plaintiffs,
Chicago blacks charged local realtors with discrimination in the sale
of housing.' 3 Several years before the Chicago suit, journalist Balk
had written an article on housing discrimination in Chicago entitled
"Confessions of a Block-Buster," which appeared in the Saturday Eve-
ning Post.'4 Information for the article was provided by a local real-
tor who agreed to describe Chicago "blockbusting" practices on the con-
dition that his identity be kept secret. When Balk refused to reveal
the identity of the Chicago realtor in a deposition taken in New York,
plaintiffs moved for an order under Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure to compel discovery. A federal district court in New
York denied the motion,' 5 and plaintiffs appealed the order to the
Second Circuit.' 6
8. N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.2 (1973); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 9-19.1-1
to -2 (1973).
9. N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1973, at 58, cols. 3-6.
10. Blasi, The Justice and the Journalist, THE NATION, Sept. 18, 1972, at 199.
11. 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 93 S. Ct. 2147 (1973).
12. Two other circuit courts have recognized a qualified privilege for newsmen:
Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986 (8th Cir. 1972); Caldwell v. United States,
434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970).
13. Contract Buyers League v. F & F Investment, Civil No. 69-15 (N.D. Ill.
filed 1969).
14. July 14-21, 1962, at 15.
15. Baker v. F & F Investment, 339 F. Supp. 942 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
16. Generally, interlocutory appeals from discovery orders are not permitted,
see, e.g., Alexander v. United States, 201 U.S. 117 (1906); Borderm Co. v. Sylk, 410
F.2d 843 (3d Cir. 1969); United States v. Fried, 386 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1967). Orders
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In a unanimous decision, the Second Circuit upheld the lbwer
court's order. While declining to find either New York or Illinois
"shield" laws17 controlling in Baker, the court recognized the first
amendment interests in the public's receiving news and in the news-
man's gathering news implicit in those laws and held those interests
controlling. The Second Circuit applied a conventional first amend-
ment balancing approach, weighing the journalist's first amendment
right to disseminate and gather information and the public's need to
be informed against the plaintiffs' and the public's interest in com-
pelling testimony in judicial proceedings. The court found no "over-
riding and compelling interest" to which the first amendment interests
must yield. 8
The Second Circuit distinguished Branzburg since it was confined
to grand jury investigations of criminal activity.' 9 The court in Baker
compelling discovery in a district other than the district in which the main action is
brought are ordinarily non-appealable interlocutory decisions, see, e.g., National Nut
Co. v. Kelling Nut Co., 134 F.2d 532 (7th Cir. 1943). An order denying discovery
in an "outside" jurisdiction, however, is immediately reviewable. Republic Gear Co.
v. Borg-Warner Corp., 381 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1967). See also Baker v. F & F Invest-
ment, 470 F.2d 778, 780 (2d Cir. 1972); 9 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACMcE 1 110.13[2],
at 157 (2d ed. 1973).
17. N.Y. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (McKmney Supp. 1972) provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of any general or specific law to the con-
trary, no professional journalist or newscaster employed or otherwise associ-
ated with any newspaper, magazine, news agency, press association, wire
service, radio or television transmission station or network, shall be adjudged
in contempt by any court, the legislature or other body having contempt
powers, for refusing or failing to disclose any news or the source of any such
news coming into his possession in the course of gathering or obtaining news
for publication or to be published in a newspaper, magazine, or for broadcast
by a radio or television transmission station or network, by which he is pro-
fessionally employed or otherwise associated in a news gathering capacity. . . .
ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 51, §§ 111-19 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972) provide for a
privilege only to withhold disclosure of confidential sources. Section 111 states:
"No court may compel any person to disclose the source of any information obtained
by a reporter during the course of his employment except as provided in this Act."
Further limitations restrict the privilege. Section 111 provides: "The privilege
conferred by this Act is not available in any libel or slander action in which a re-
porter or news medium is a party defendant." Section 117 provides that the court
may divest the privilege if it finds:
(a) that the information sought does not concern matters, or details in
any proceeding, required to be kept secret under the laws of this State or of
the Federal government; and
(b) that all other available sources of information have been exhausted
and disclosure of the information sought is essential to the protection of the
public interest involved.
18. 470 F.2d at 783.
19. The Supreme Court stated in Branzburg: "The sole issue before us is the
obligation of reporters to respond to grand jury subpoenas as other citizens do and to
answer questions relevant to an investigation into the commission of crime." 408
U.S. at 682.
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emphasized that "[n]o such criminal overtones color the facts in this
civil case. '' 20  The Second Circuit also declined to follow Garland v.
Torre,21 the leading civil case concerning a journalist's first amend-
ment claim to testimonial privilege. Garland had rejected the report-
er's first amendment argument, but the Baker court contended that the
case was distinguishable since the plaintiff in Garland had taken unsuc-
cessful independent action to discover the identity of the defendant's
source and the identity of the source was essential to the plaintiff's
suit. In the Baker fact situation, persons other than Balk might have
disclosed the identity of the source, yet the plaintiffs made no attempt
to exhaust this possibility. Furthermore, the court asserted that the
identity of Balk's source did not go to the heart of the case. Also,
Balk was not a party to the underlying action.22
The ease with which the Second Circuit distinguished Baker from
Branzburg and Garland and the court's facility in finding a basis in
the first amendment for Balk's refusal to disclose his source should not
mask the truly innovative approach of the Baker court. The court's
finding first amendment grounds for reportorial "privilege" appears un-
usual in light of prior development of the law in this area.
The common-law rule recognizes no evidentiary privilege for
newsmen similar to that enjoyed by physicians and attorneys in their
professional capacities. 23  Thus, newsmen may be compelled to reveal
information given to them in confidence and to disclose the identity of
confidential sources. This rule is uniformly observed in all types of
legal proceedings: grand jury investigations, 24 judicial investigations re-
lating to grand jury proceedings, 25 criminal trials, 20 legislative investi-
gations,"7 and civil litigation.28  Generally, courts have been unrecep-
tive to the newsman's argument that an evidentiary privilege is essen-
tial to the maintenance of the journalist's livelihood,20 although courts
20. 470 F.2d at 784.
21. 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958).
22. 470 F.2d at 783-84.
23. See Annot., 7 A.L.R.3d 591 (1966).
24. Clein v. State, 52 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 1950) (en bane); In re Grunow, 84
NJ.L. 235, 85 A. 1011 (1913); People ex rel. Mooney v. Sheriff, 269 N.Y. 291, 199
N.E. 415 (1936); People ex rel. Phelps v. Fancher, 2 Hun 226 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1874).
25. Joslyn v. People, 67 Colo. 297, 184 P. 375 (1919).
26. People v. Durrant, 116 Cal. 179, 48 P. 75 (1897); Plunkett v. Hamilton,
136 Ga. 72, 70 S.E. 781 (1911); Pledger v. State, 77 Ga. 242, 3 S.E. 320 (1887); of.
Rosenberg v. Carroll, 99 F. Supp. 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
27. Ex parte Lawrence, 116 Cal. 298, 48 P. 124 (1897) (per curiam).
28. Brewster v. Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., 20 F.R.D. 416 (D. Mass. 1957).
29. See, e.g., Plunkett v. Hamilton, 136 Ga. 72, 70 S.E. 781 (1911).
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regularly exclude relevant evidence as a method of protecting other
confidential relationships (husband-wife, attorney-client, physician-pa-
tient, and informer-police). 30 Likewise, the Proposed Federal Rules
of Evidence include no newsmen's privilege.31
Many cases that rely on the common-law rule give no reason
for its application.3 2  When a reason is given, the most frequent ex-
planation for the rule denying a newsman's privilege is the superior
interest of the public in compelling testimony over any private consid-
erations that exist between newsmen and their sources. 83 The courts
often cite Wigmore, who disfavors privileges as "so many derogations
from a positive general rule [that everyone is obligated to testify when
properly summoned]" and as "obstacle[s] to the administration of jus-
tice."34
Only twenty states so far have legislated evidentiary privileges for
newsmen,35 in derogation of the common-law rule. Even where stat-
utes exist, however, journalists receive little protection, since many of
these laws provide heavily qualified privileges.3" Furthermore, "shield"
30. See, e.g., People ex rel Mooney v. Sheriff, 269 N.Y. 291, 199 N.E. 415
(1936).
31. PRoPosED FED. R. Evm. (although the Supreme Court approved the new Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence on November 20, 1972, to become effective July 1, 1973, the
Rules are still "Proposed" because Congress passed legislation which requires express
Congressional approval before the Rules can become effective. Act of March 30,
1970, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9. At the time of this writing, Congress had not
yet approved the Rules).
32. Brewster v. Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., 20 F.R.D. 416 (D. Mass. 1957);
People v. Durrant, 116 Cal. 179, 48 P. 75 (1897); Pledger v. State, 77 Ga. 242, 3
S.E. 320 (1887).
33. See, e.g., Plunkett v. Hamilton, 136 Ga. 72, 83, 70 S.E. 781, 786 (1971);
People ex rel. Mooney v. Sheriff, 269 N.Y. 291, 295, 199 N.E. 415, 416 (1936).
34. 8 1. WiGMoRB, EVIDENCE § 2192, at 70, 73 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
35. See jurisdictions cited in notes 1 and 8 supra.
36. ALAsKA STAT. §§ 09.25.160 (Supp. 1970) requires disclosure of sources if the
withholding of testimony would result in a "miscarriage of justice" or is "contrary to
the public interest." In Arkansas, under ARn. STAT. ANN. § 43-917 (1964), the
newsman must disclose his source if his article containing confidential information was
published "in bad faith, with malice, and not in the interest of the public welfare."
In Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 51, §§ 111-19 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972) withdraws the
newsman's privilege in libel and slander actions in which the newsman is a party de-
fendant and may require disclosure of confidential sources if "the information sought
does not concern matters. . . required to be kept secret" under state or federal law or
if "all other available sources of information have been exhausted and disclosure ...
is essential to the protection of the public interest involved." In Louisiana, LA. RLv.
STAT. §§ 45:1451-54 (Supp. 1970) requires disclosure of confidential sources when
"essential to the public interest." In New Mexico, under N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-
12.1 (Supp. 1970) disclosure of sources is required when "essential to prevent injus-
tice."
In six states the newsman enjoys a privilege to withhold his source only after
publication of an article baed on confidential iformation. See ALA. CODE tit. 7,
1556 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51
laws in derogation of the common law are strictly construed; courts
that have interpreted existing statutes have frequently denied the priv-
ilege altogether. Strict construction of newsmen's statutory privileges
has been the rule in both criminal proceedings 7 and civil litigation3 8
In only a limited number of cases has the journalist been successful.80
The present uncertainty as to the applicability of state law in federal
courts poses another hazard to the journalist if the question of statutory
privilege arises in federal question cases. Baker, for example, chose
to ignore both the "shield" laws of Illinois (the forum state) and New
York (the state where Balk's deposition was taken).4 °
The first amendment claim to a newsman's privilege was pre-
sented initially in Garland v. Torre,41 a civil action in which actress
Judy Garland brought suit against newspaper columnist Marie Torre
§ 370 (1960); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (Supp. 1970); CAL. EVI. CODE
ANN. § 1070 (West 1966); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (1969); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 35, § 2 (1971); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A-84A-21, -29 (Supp. 1969).
Three states protect confidential communications received from sources, see MICH.
STAT. ANN. § 28-945(1) (1954); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTs LAw § 79-h (McKinney Supp.
1970); PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 28, § 330 (Supp. 1970). Other states which permit the
newsman to withhold the identity of sources require disclosure of confidential commu-
nications.
37. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); State v. Donovan, 129 N.J.L. 478,
30 A.2d 421 (1943).
California's statute was strictly construed in the case of William Farr, when the
court held the statute inapplicable. See note 4 supra. Peter Bridge was cited for
contempt and jailed despite the New Jersey statutory privilege for newsmen. In re
Bridge, 120 N.J. Super. 460, 295 A.2d 3 (1972), cert. denied, 93 S. Ct. 1500 (1973).
38. In re Cepeda, 233 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (Cal. statute); Deltec, Inc.
v. Dun. & Bradstreet, Inc., 187 F. Supp. 788 (N.D. Ohio 1960) (Ohio statute); Brogan
v. Passaic Daily News, 22 NJ. 139, 123 A.2d 473 (1956); Beecroft v. Point Pleasant
Printing & Publishing Co., 82 NJ. Super. 269, 197 A.2d 416 (1964).
39. Ex parte Sparrow, 14 F.R.D. 351, (N.D. Ala. 1953) (libel action, Ala-
bama statute); In re Howard, 136 Cal. App. 2d 816, 289 P.2d 537 (1955) (labor dis-
pute); In re Taylor, 412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181 (1963) (grand jury investigation).
40. In deciding whether to apply the federal or state law on privilege, the rule is
clear in cases arising in federal courts under diversity jurisdiction: state law is de-
terminative, see Cervantes v. Time Inc., 464 F.2d 986, 989 (8th Cir. 1972). Courts
are divided, however, as to the obligation of federal courts to follow state privilege
rules when the underlying action arises in federal question cases. See Annot., 95
A.L.R.2d 320 (1964); Comment, Evidentiary Privileges in the Federal Courts, 52 CAL.
L Rv. 640 (1964). Although the Second Circuit in Baker held state law nondetermin.
ative, the Ninth Circuit ruled in Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960), that
if state laws of privilege are regarded as not mere rules of evidence but as substantive
rights, the Erie principle should apply and state law should be followed even in federal
question cases. In the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, rule 501, however, the
Advisory Committee's note indicates that federal law will henceforth control in cases
arising under federal question jurisdiction, i.e., newsmen will enjoy no evidentiary
privilege.
41. 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958).
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for publishing defamatory remarks allegedly made by CBS officials.
The plaintiff moved to compel Miss Torre to reveal the source of the
alleged statements, but the columnist refused on the grounds that dis-
closure of confidential news sources would encroach upon freedom of
the press. Miss Torre contended "it would impose an important prac-
tical restraint on the flow of news from news sources to news media
and would thus diminish pro tanto the flow of news to the public."4
In dictum the court accepted the journalist's argument that compulsory
disclosure of confidential news sources may entail an abridgement of
press freedom. Nevertheless, the court rejected Miss Torre's claim to
privilege in holding that first amendment considerations were not ab-
solute and would yield under the Constitution "to a paramount public
interest in the fair administration of justice."43  The Garland rule,
which has since become the majority view, resurfaced in two other civil
cases: In re Goodfader4 and Adams v. Associated Press.45  In both
cases the courts emphasized the importance of compulsory testimony
as opposed to first amendment interests in nondisclosure.
At least seven decisions involving grand jury investigations have
echoed similar rejections of a newsman's first amendment privilege, 46
the most important of which was the Supreme Court's ruling in Branz-
burg. Although journalists in these cases argued for a privilege based
on the public's right to the news, the news editor in State v. Buchanan,47
as well as reporters Branzburg, Pappas, and Caldwell, claimed a priv-
ilege also grounded on a newsman's right to gather news. 48  In reject-
ing this claim, the Buchanan court stated that a newsman has no con-
stitutional right to information that is not accessible to the public gen-
erally and that granting special privileges to newsmen would violate
notions of equal protection. 49 The Supreme Court reiterated this view
42. Id. at 547-48. The argument that the first amendment exists to preserve an
"untrammeled press as a vital source of public information" has received Supreme
Court approval, Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936); cf. Thorn-
hill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940).
43. 259 F.2d at 549.
44. 45 Hawaii 317, 367 P.2d 472 (1961).
45. 46 F.R.D. 439 (S.D. Tex. 1969).
46. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d
345 (Ky. 1971); In re Pappas, 358 Mass. 614, 266 N.E.2d 297 (1971); In re Bridge,
120 N.J. Super. 460, 295 A.2d 3 (1972); State v. Buchanan, 250 Ore. 244, 436 P.2d
729, cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968); In re Taylor, 412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181 (1963);
State v. Knops, 49 Wis. 2d 647, 183 N.W.2d 93 (1971).
47. 250 Ore. 244, 436 P.2d 729 (1968).
48. Id. at 247, 436 P.2d at 730.
49. Id. at 247-49, 436 P.2d at 731.
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in Branzburg.5° In rejecting newsmen's alternative first amendment
claims based on the public's right to news, the courts either placed a
higher value on the public's "right to everyman's evidence" 1 than on
the public's "need to know" or considered the relationship between
the protection of news sources and the gathering of news excessively
tenuous.
5 2
Prior to Baker, few decisions had granted newsmen a qualified
right to withhold information. 3 Among those decisions, the opinion
of the Ninth Circuit in Caldwell v. United States"4 was subsequently
overturned by the Supreme Court. Two civil libel cases, Alioto v.
Cowles Communications, Inc.55 and Cervantes v. Time, Inc.,sc al-
though they affirmed reporters' first amendment claims of privilege, in-
volved issues different than those that the Baker court confronted;
5 7
neither could serve as exact precedent to Baker.
In giving effect to qualified constitutional privilege, Baker seems
to be a clear departure from the mainstream of law. Yet this case ap-
pears in some aspects to follow Branzburg and Garland. Although
the Branzburg rule was strictly confined to grand jury investigations,
the Supreme Court indicated that in general only "compelling" or
"paramount" interests would override first amendment rights.58 Simi-
larly, Garland asserted that "compulsory disclosure of a journalist's
confidential sources of information may entail an abridgment of press
freedom '"59 and that any infringement of first amendment rights would
be justified only in view of an overriding public interest in compelling
testimony. 60 The court in Baker could have easily reached its decision
50. 408 U.S. at 684.
51. See note 34 supra.
52. See, e.g., 408 U.S. at 693-94.
53. Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986 (8th Cir. 1972); Caldwell v. United
States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970); Air Transport Ass'n v. Professional Air Traffic
Controllers Organization, Crim. Nos. 70-400, -410 (E.D.N.Y. April 6, 1970 at 21,
38-39, 149-50) cited in Comment, Reporters and Their Sources: The Constitutional
Right to a Confidential Relationship, 80 YALE L.J. 317, 318 n.7 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Reporters]; Alioto v. Cowles Communications, Inc., C.A. 52150 (N.D. Cal.
Dec. 4, 1969 at 165-67) cited in Reporters 318 n.7; People v. Dohrn, Crim. No. 69-
3808 (Cir. Ct. Cook Cty., Ill. May 20, 1970) cited in Reporters 313 n.7; People v.
Rios, No. 75129 (Super. Ct. San Francisco Cty. 1970) cited in Reporters 318 n.7.
54. 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970).
55. C.A. 52150 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 1969 at 165-67) cited in Reporters 318 n.7.
56. 464 F.2d 986 (8th Cir. 1972).
57. See text accompanying notes 86 and 87 infra.
58. 408 U.S. at 700.




within the framework of Justice Powell's concurring and controlling
opinion in Branzburg,6 1 which asserted the legitimacy of resisting de-
mands that bear only a "remote and tenuous relationship to the subject
of the investigation .. *"62 The identity of Balk's news source was
tangential to the thrust of the Baker plaintiffs' complaint. The neces-
sity for disclosing the confidential source was in no way "compelling"
or "paramount." In fact, it paled in significance to the importance
of unearthing information for grand jury investigations. According
to this view, Baker reached a different result because it was factually
distinguishable from. Branzburg. The same conclusion may apply in
comparing Baker to Garland. The court in Baker apparently accepted
the view expressed in Garland that when disclosure of a newsman's
confidential sources goes "to the heart of the. . . claim" a compelling
need may be found sufficient to override first amendment interests. 3
The court may have affirmed the newsman's position because the iden-
tity of the news source "simply did not go to the heart of appellants'
case ... ""
Nevertheless, the congruence between Baker on the one hand, and
Branzburg and Garland on the other, is superficial and should not mask
the real disparity between Baker's language and approach and that of
Branzburg or Garland. The court in Baker recognized what Branz-
burg and Garland accepted only as an hypothesis: "[c]ompelled dis-
closure of confidential sources unquestionably threatens a journalist's
ability to secure information that is made available to him only on a
confidential basis."6 5  Garland postulated only an "hypothesis that
compulsory disclosure of a journalist's confidential sources of informa-
tion may entail an abridgment of press freedom by imposing some
limitation upon the availability of news."6 6 The Second Circuit at the
time of the Garland decision was unconvinced that first amendment
interests were involved. So was the Supreme Court in deciding Branz-
burg. It asserted that its decision in no way threatened the vast bulk
of confidential relationships between reporters and their sources67 and
61. 408 U.S. at 709-10. Since the Court was split five to four in its decision,
Powell as the fifth and pivotal member of the majority carried, in his concurring
opinion, the controlling view.
62. Id. at 710.
63. 470 F.2d at 783-84.
64. Id. at 783.
65. Id. at 782 (emphasis added).
66. 259 F.2d at 548 (emphasis added).
67. 408 U.S. at 691.
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contended that the existing rules denying a newsman's privilege "have
not been a serious obstacle to either the development or retention of
confidential news sources by the press."08  The Court ruled that the
burden on news gathering that results from forced disclosures was at
best uncertain.69
Baker went one step further than Garland or Branzburg by reaf-
firming the Buchanan claim that the press, independent of the public's
right to information, has a constitutional right to gather news.7" Gdr-
land had refused to elevate the press's interest beyond a mere private
stake in withholding news, and Branzburg flatly rejected the notion
of a newsman's right to gather news.71  Baker further transformed the
terms in the balancing analysis by relabelling the interests involved in
civil litigation. Garland had asserted that the balancing test in civil
actions pitted a public interest in compelled testimony against a news-
man's private interest in withholding information. 7z Baker, on the
other hand, alluded to the "public and private interests" in nondis-
closure rivalling the litigants' "private interest" in compelled disclosure.78
Baker not only transformed the terms of the balancing equation
but also modified the weight given those terms. Whereas Garland
and Branzburg emphasized the "paramount public interest in the fair
administration of justice, ' 74 Baker stressed the preferred position of
the first amendment.75 Underlining the "paramount public interest in
the maintenance of a vigorous, aggressive and independent press, ' 70
Baker asserted that only in "rare" cases, "few in number," will first
amendment rights yield to competing interests.7 The contrary pre-
sumption prevails in both Branzburg and Garland.
68. Id. at 699.
69. Id. at 693.
70. 470 F.2d at 782.
71. "It has generally been held that the First Amendment does not guarantee the
press a constitutional right of special access to information not available to the public
generally." 408 U.S. at 684. If the Court's statement is a rejection of the newsman's
private claim as a balancing test factor in all legal proceedings, the Second Circuit may
have exceeded its jurisdiction by violating the Supreme Court's dictum. If, on the
other hand, one accepts literally the Supreme Court's assertion that its opinion in
Branzburg was strictly confined to grand jury proceedings, Baker may easily be dis-
tinguished from Branzburg. Baker may be viewed as recognizing a newsman's private
first amendment interest in the context of civil litigation only.
72. 259 F.2d at 549.
73. 470 F.2d at 782, 785.
74. 259 F.2d at 549.
75. 470 F.2d at 783.
76. Id. at 782.
77. Id. at 783.
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Most significantly, Baker demonstrates the potential of lower
courts to limit Branzburg by refusing to apply its rule outside grand
jury proceedings. Lower courts seeking to overcome the Supreme
Court's ruling may do so not only because the Court confined its deci-
sion strictly to grand jury investigations, 7 but also because the first
amendment balancing equation varies significantly with the legal con-
text in which the newsman's claim is presented. The argument for
a newsman's testimonial privilege has been asserted generally in five
basic types of legal proceedings: (1) grand jury investigations, (2)
criminal trials, (3) civil litigation, not including defamatory actions,
(4) civil defamatory litigation, and (5) legislative hearings. Although
the balance of interests that determines the success of a newsman's
first amendment claim is decided on a case-by-case basis, 79 the char-
acter of the proceedings in which the claim is asserted will be a major
determinant in the balancing test. Under that test, the claims on the
newsman's side-the public's right to information and the newsman's
interest in gathering news-are constant, independent of the nature of
the legal proceedings. The interests on the opposite side of the scales
vary, however, with the nature of the legal context.
In grand jury investigations the obligation to appear and testify
is especially strong and the scope of permissible inquiry is broad."
The Supreme Court noted in Branzburg that the scope of inquiry is
necessarily far-reaching because the task of the grand jury "is to inquire
into the existence of possible criminal conduct and to return only well-
founded indictments. ... "81 Grand jury investigations, it observed,
are "constitutionally mandated for the institution of federal criminal
prosecutions for capital or other serious crimes," ' and "[t]he adoption
of the grand jury 'in our Constitution as the sole method for preferring
charges in serious criminal cases shows the high place it held as an in-
strument of justice.' ,,83
In criminal trials since the prosecution's interest in compelling testi-
mony approximates that of the prosecution in grand jury investiga-
tions, one may speculate that the scales will generally be weighted
against the newsman. Another factor weighing against the newsman's
78. 408 U.S. at 682.
79. Id. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring).
80. Id. at 688.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 687.
83. Id., quoting Costello v, United States, 350 U.S, 359, 362 (1956).
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first amendment claim is that the defendant in criminal cases has a
constitutional right ". . . to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor. .... ,,84
In civil litigation the newsman stands a far greater chance of suc-
cessfully arguing a constitutional testimonial privilege than in grand
jury investigations or criminal trials. He may rely on the Supreme
Court's assertion of the superior status of the grand jury in distin-
guishing his case. Also, in civil litigation, unlike grand jury investi-
gations and criminal trials, the interest in compelling testimony is ex-
clusively that of a private litigant.8 5 Pitted against the newsman's ar-
gument in favor of a public right to nondisclosure, the private litigant
in civil litigation may have difficulty in compelling confidential infor-
mation from newsmen.
In civil defamatory action, however, the outcome of the balanc-
ing test is less clear. On one hand, recognition of a newsman's priv-
ilege in defamatory actions could destroy libel actions against news
media. Plaintiffs are required to prove that news-defendants acted
with "reckless disregard of the truth,"8' 6 a difficult requirement if news-
men can hide behind anonymous sources. On the other hand, if
newsmen are denied a testimonial privilege in defamatory actions, the
danger exists that public figures could get access to reporters' sources
merely by filing libel suits. 87
In legislative hearings the newsman must overcome a tradition of
broad legislative investigatory powers, but he may point to the Court's
assertion in Branzburg of the superior status of the grand jury in dis-
tinguishing his case. The newsman may also rely on a few cases that
suggest first amendment limitations on legislative powers to investi-
gate.8 8
Baker leaves at least two critical questions unanswered. First,
should a qualified privilege for newsmen vary with the nature of the
news reported? Arguably, the courts should grant greater protection
84. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
85. Baker v. F & F Investment, 470 F.2d at 783, 785.
86. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
87. See Blasi, The Justice and the Journalist, THm NATION, Sept. 18, 1972; Hume,
A Chilling Effect on the Press, N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1972, § 6 (Magazine) at 82;
id., Feb. 22, 1973, at 10, cols. 4-5.
88. See, e.g., DeGregory v. Attorney Gen., 383 U.S. 825 (1966); Gibson v.
Florida Legislative Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S.
178 (1957) (dictum); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
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to coverage of governmental misconduct, civil corruption, foreign ag-
gression, and serious crimes, rather than to gossip items or articles
covering the private lives of public figures, for example. On the other
hand, this type of distinction could engage the judiciary in a dangerous
arbitration of what news the public needs to know. Secondly, how
can Baker's qualified privilege approach, which relies on such incal-
culable contingencies as whether the information sought "goes to the
heart of . . . the case," whether the identity of the news source will
be demanded in a civil trial or a grand jury investigation, or whether
the party seeking confidential information will have recourse to an-
other available source, help the newsman at the critical moment when
the source is approached? Unless the newsman, who cannot know
the answer to such variables prior to ligitation, is able to guarantee
confidentiality, his source may refuse to talk.
Despite its shortcomings, Baker represents a judicial giant-step to-
ward recognition that a newsman's privilege is today necessary to pro-
tect the free flow of information to the public. Events subsequent to
Branzburg have shown that the Supreme Court's ruling has had a
chilling effect on the press,89 retarding precisely that type of reflective
and socially relevant news coverage that the Second Circuit sought to
protect in Baker. Hopefully, the Baker decision will serve as a model
to lower courts in limiting Branzburg's application and as a guide to
federal and state legislatures in drawing up statutory privileges for
newsmen. In the growing number of civil actions in which private
litigants demand disclosure of confidential news sources,90 Baker will
have its greatest impact as precedent.
It would be misleading, however, to exaggerate Baker's impor-
tance, since the question of privilege depends greatly on the factual
nuances of each case. Uncertainty in the area of a constitutional testi-
monal privilege for newsmen outside grand jury investigations awaits
resolution by the Supreme Court.
DIANA CARTER PRADKA
89. See generally, Hume, A Chilling Effect on the Press, N.Y. Times, Dec. 17,
1972), § 6 (Magazine), at 13.
Reporter Earl Caldwell has stated, for example: "From now on no newspaper can
hope to cover effectively an organization such as the Panthers. I don't care how black.
a reporter is, he won't get close. He won't and he shouldn't try. He won't because
he cannot be trusted as a reporter." Ask me, I Know. I was the Test Case, SATUDAY
R vmw, Aug. 5, 1972, at 5.
90. Blasi, Privilege in a Time of Violence, Tun NATION, Dec. 21, 1970, at 655,
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Constitutional Law-Limiting the Use of Standardized Intelli-
gence Tests for Ability Grouping' in Public Schools
Judge Peckham of the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California faced a somewhat unusual allegation of de facto
segregation in the case of P. v. Riles.2  The de facto segregation al-
legedly existed not among individual schools of the local school dis-
trict, but among classes within each individual school. Plaintiffs, who
remained anonymous for their own protection, alleged that placement
of blacks in classes for the educable mentally retarded (EMR classes)
on the basis of I.Q. tests is a denial of equal protection.' The district
court, noting the presence of cultural bias4 in the I.Q. tests and the
great proportion of blacks in the EMR classes, 5 agreed with the plain-
tiffs and granted a preliminary injunction prohibiting the use of I.Q.
tests as the primary standard for placement in EMR classes or for re-
evaluating those already placed in EMR classes. 6 At the same time the
court denied plaintiffs' request for a mandatory injunction "requiring the
defendants to take affirmative action to compensate black students who
have been wrongfully placed in EMR classes at some time in the past."'7
Plaintiffs had sought supplemental education for those students whose
progress had been hindered by erroneous placement in EMR classes,
hiring of black psychologists to insure that blacks were judged fairly,
and establishment of a ratio limiting the percentage of blacks allowable
in EMR classes. 8
Judge Peckham found that wrongful placement of students in
EMR classes warranted injunctive relief. He said, "[E]ven if a stu-
dent remains in an EMR class for only one month, that placement is
1. The phrase "ability grouping" refers to the practice of dividing students
according to their measured ability to learn at a certain level.
2. 343 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
3. In support of this allegation, plaintiffs further alleged that I.Q. tests were the
primary standard used to place children in these classes, that many blacks scored low
because of the cultural bias present in the test itself, and that as a result of this er-
rondous placement, these students were being deprived of an equal educational oppor-
tunity. Id. at 1308.
4. The phrase "cultural bias" refers to that factor present in certain tests that
causes a particular child to perform poorly on the test because of his cultural or
environmental background.
5. The complaint alleged that while only 28.5% of all students in the school
district were black, 66% of all students in EMR classes were blacks. 343 F. Supp. at
1311.
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noted on his permanent record, his education is retarded to some de-
gree, and he is subjected to whatever humiliation students are exposed
to for being separated into classes for the educable mentally retarded."9
The most important question before the court was whether blacks
were being wrongfully placed in EMR classes in violation of their rights
to equal protection. At this point the court made a significant pro-
cedural decision. The traditional equal protection test places the bur-
den on the plaintiff to show that no rational relationship existed between
the method of classification used and the resulting classification.10
Judge Peckham rejected this traditional test and ruled that the burden
of persuasion would be shifted to the defendants on the establishment
of a prima facie case by the plaintiffs." Consequently, the plaintiffs
needed only to show that the I.Q. tests resulted in a racial imbalance
and the court would shift the burden of persuasion of a rational re-
lationship to the defendants."2
The court relied on analogous cases in the areas of employment
discrimination,' 3 jury selection,' 4 and school desegregation 5 to support
this shift. In addition to these lines of case law, Judge Peckham de-
lineated three policies behind the shift: 1) shifting the burden of proof
is a reflection of the strong judical policy against racial discrimina-
tion;16 2) in a racial discrimination case there is sometimes said to ex-
ist an affirmative duty to implement integration in certain of our
institutions;' 7 and 3) an empirical assumption that native intelligence
is randomly distributed among the population and that if an uneven
classification on that basis is found, it is probably due to discrimina-
tion.' s
9. Id. at 1308. Plaintiffs' evidence consisted of the results of standard I.Q.
tests administered by black psychologists with special emphasis on reducing the cul-
tural bias in the test through the acceptance of non-standard answers and through
rewording of some of the questions that tended to show that plaintiffs were mentally
retarded. Id. Plaintiffs' irreparable injury allegedly flowed "from plaintiffs' place-
ment in EMR classes because the curriculum is so minimal academically, teacher ex-
pectations are so low, and because other students subject EMR students to ridicule
on account of their status." Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1311.
12. Id.
13. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
14. Carmical v. Craven, 457 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
929 (1972).
15. United States v. School Dist. 151, 286 F. Supp. 786 (N.D. Ill.), affd, 404
F.2d 1125 (7th Cir. 1968).
16. 343 F. Supp. at 1309.
17. Id. at 1310.
18. Id.
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The court found that the statistical evidence alleged by plaintiff
was sufficient to establish a racial imbalance. To establish the second
element of their prima facie case, that I.Q. tests were the primary de-
terminant in placement, plaintiffs relied mainly on the finding of Hob-
son v. Hansen10 that I.Q. tests influence all of the other evaluations of a
student made by school officials. Teacher evaluation was shown in
Hobson to be especially tainted by knowledge of a student's I.Q. score.20
In finding that the plaintiffs had presented a prima facie case of
discrimination, the court relied on the influence argument of Hobson
as well as language in the Education Code21 stating that other evidence
must "substantiate" the I.Q. score before a student could be placed
in an EMR class.22
Once the burden of proving rationality had shifted to them, de-
fendants argued that the racial imbalance was not a result of the tests
or that the tests, though racially biased, were still rationally related to
the classification because they were the only means of classification
available. 23  The court made quick work of these arguments dismiss-
ing the first by observing that defendants had failed to produce any
supporting evidence in its favor and dismissing the second by alluding
to alternative methods of placing mentally retarded students in prac-
tice in New York and Massachusetts.24
After this dismissal of defendants' arguments, the court granted
the preliminary injunction sought by the plaintiffs but rejected their
other claims for mandatory relief in order to give defendants flexibility
in formulating a corrective plan.25  The narrow holding of the case was
that the use of I.Q. tests as the primary basis for placing black stu-
dents in classes for the educable mentally retarded that results in a
significant racial imbalance in such classes is a denial of equal protec-
tion. This result was based on the absence of any evidence to establish
19. 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 801 (1969).
20. Id. at 484.
21. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 6902.085 (West Supp. 1973).
22. 343 F. Supp. at 1312. The court also found that the use of I.Q. scores by
parents in signing required consent forms tainted the consent features of the Code so
as to make the consent not a truly voluntary one. The court found that parents were
overawed by the seemingly scientific significance of the LQ. scores. Id. at 1313.
23. Id. The defendants also argued that the racial imbalance resulted from the
"location of EMR classes in predominantly black schools prior to desegregation" and
because more white parents of mentally retarded children put their children in private
schools than did black parents of mentally retarded children. Id.
24. Id. The court cited the use of achievement tests and teacher evaluation in
New York and the Massachusetts requirement of "psychological assessment." Both of
these districts exclude the use of group I.Q. tests. Id. at 1314,
25. Id. at 1314-15.
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that I.Q. tests were culture free21 or that a reasonable rationale for
the use of the present culturally biased text existed. Since defendants
failed to carry their burden of proof/persuasion by producing evidence
to show that the tests were culture free, the result might conceivably
be different in future cases in which defendants are more diligent.
The question treated by the federal district court has never reached
the Supreme Court, but it has been treated extensively by at least one
other district court and incidentally by several other courts.2r The
right of school districts to separate students on the basis of learning
ability was recognized in Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Board of Ed-
ucation.28  In Jones v. School Board 9 assignments were made to par-
ticular schools on the basis of I.Q. scores. The court held that this use
of I.Q. tests was not unconstitutional per se; however, this standard
must be "properly applied".8" The court also stated that the school
district could not consider racial factors in making assignment deci-
sions. In contrast to P. v. Riles, the Jones court left the burden of proof
of the issue of rational relationship on the plaintiff.3'
In Miller v. School District Number 2 32 the issue of ability group-
ing was also raised. In that decision the district court explained that its
primary concern was to prevent racial discrimination and that "the
practice of separating study groups or classes into accelerated or slow
sections is a matter for educators. '33
Both of these earlier cases treated the use of I.Q. tests incidentally
in the context of broader school desegregation questions. These courts
were more concerned with the achievement of integration within a
school district and the avoidance of blatant discrimination in school at-
tendance than with unintentional intra-school segregation of the type
resulting from the use of I.Q. tests in class placement. Ability group-
ing was regarded as an educational tool to be employed at the discre-
tion of those in charge of operating the school system.' Their decision
26. A culture free test is one that lacks the elements creating cultural bias.
See generally P. Pascale, The Impossible Dream: A Culture-Free Test, 1971 (pub-
lished on microfiche by Educ. Research Information Center, catalog no. ED 054 217).
27. See text accompanying notes 28-33 and 45-49 infra.
28. 162 F. Supp. 372 (N.D. Ala. 1958) (dictum), aff'd, 358 U.S. 101 (1958).
"Pupils may, of course, be separated according to their degree of advancement or
retardation, their ability to learn . . . ." Borders v. Rippy, 247 F.2d 268, 271
(5th Cir. 1957), quoted, 162 F. Supp. at 378.
29. 278 F.2d 72 (4th Cir. 1960) (per curiam).
30. Id. at 75.
31. Id. at 77.
32. 256 F. Supp. 370 (D.S.C. 1966).
33. Id. at 375.
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was final so far as the courts were concerned as long as race was not
a criterion in placement. They seemed to have been unaware of the
possibility of having de facto segregation arising totally from the use of
I.Q. tests themselves.
The argument that discrimination might arise from the cultural
bias of I.Q. tests finally emerged in the first extensive judicial treat-
ment of ability grouping. Judge Skelly Wright wrote at length on this
problem in Hobson v. Hansen in 1967. In the context of a major at-
tack on segregation in the District of Columbia's school system, plain-
tiffs attacked the use of a track system by local school authorities that
divided pupils into four tracks ranging from "basic' to "honors" based
primarily on comparative I.Q. scores. The school officials acknowl-
edged that the track system was developed as a "response to problems
created by the sudden commingling of numerous educationally re-
tarded Negro students with the better educated white students."8 4
Judge Wright found that the "effect of this separation would be to insu-
late the more academically developed white student from his less for-
tunate black schoolmate, thus minimizing the impact of integration
. . ,,5 Despite no evidence of an intentional violation, the court
held that the use of I.Q. tests to support a track system was a violation
of equal protection since these tests were standardized on a white middle
class level and thus were discriminatory against blacks.30 To imple-
ment this conclusion, the court ordered the abolition of the track sys-
tem.3
7
Judge Wright seemed especially concerned over the substantial
risk that the intelligence of black children would be underestimated by
the I.Q. tests and thus they would be undereducated.3 8  The lack of
flexibility in the system, the lack of movement upward, and the lack of
any attempt to supplement the education of those blacks who were be-
hind weighed heavily in the decision. A parallel concern of the court
in Hobson was that in an urban school system blacks and whites though
going to school together were not being taught together because of
the track system.8 9 Judge Wright seemed to be saying that integrated
classrooms as well as integrated schools were needed to insure that
blacks actually received an equal educational opportunity.
34. 269 F. Supp. at 442.
35. Id. at 443.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 517.
38. Id. at 489.
39. Id. at 443.
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The court in Hobson applied the traditional equal protection test
of rationality.40 It has been pointed out, however, that "the court
seems to apply a standard less permissive than the rationality test."'41
Although Judge Wright only hinted at the application of a compelling
state interest test,42 that seems to be what he applied. 3 This more
stringent test is derived from the constitutionally suspect classification
of race.44 Judge Wright placed the burden of proof on this issue on
the defendants, and the court in P. v. Riles followed his example.
Following Hobson, other courts have seized on its reasoning in de-
ciding de facto segregation cases. In Graves v. Walton County Board
of Education"0 a federal district court in Georgia issued an injunction re-
quiring defendants to "provide remedial education programs which
permit students attending or who have previously attended segre-
gated schools to overcome past inadequacies in their education."46 In
a recent decision from a federal district court in North Carolina, the
judge described the duty on local school boards "as not simply a neg-
ative duty to refrain from active legal racial discrimination, but a
duty to act positively to fashion affirmatively a school system as free as
possible from the lasting effects of such historical apartheid."4  In
that case, however, the court sanctioned a division of students into
study groups based on achievement in a particular course even though
evidence showed that there was a high percentage of blacks in the
"slow" and "regular" sections.4 8 The court declared that it was an ed-
ucational matter whether ability grouping was allowed in a particular
school system.
From these scattered opinions, it is difficult to ascertain any com-
mon standard. The court in P. v. Riles relied only on Hobson in mak-
ing its decision. Judge Peckham drew from Hobson the shifting of the
burden of proof49 as well as the realization that testing could lead to
40. Id. at 511.
41. Note, Hobson v. Hansen: Judicial Supervision of the Color-Blind School
Board, 81 HIv. L. REv. 1511, 1519 (1968).
42. This test is applied in Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S.
621, 630 (1969). The Supreme Court decided that for a suspect classification to be
upheld it must "promote a compelling state interest." Id.
43. See 269 F. Supp. at 513; Note, 81 HA~v. L. Rnv., supra note 41, at 1519-20.
44. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
45. 300 F. Supp. 188 (M.D. Ga.), aff'd, 410 F.2d 1152 (5th Cir. 1968).
46. Id. at 200.
47. Swanm v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 300 F. Supp. 1358, 1363
(W.D.N.C. 1969).
48. Id. at 1367.
49. See note 62 infra.
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de facto segregation within a school. He did not seem as concerned,
however, over the use of ability grouping or the lack of supplemental
programs for deprived blacks as Judge Wright was. The main goal of
all courts dating from the original desegregation decision ° has been
to provide the black with an equal educational opportunity. One com-
mentator has rephrased this goal: "In a broad sense probably the most
important idea underlying the entire push for school desegregation, de-
jure and de facto, is the possibility of developing greater intellectual
and other competence in Negro children who are looked upon as cul-
turally deprived."- 1 The implementation of this goal has raised several
questions for the courts in relation to the use of I.Q. tests for ability
grouping.
Educational theorists are themselves not in agreement on the
answers to such questions as: 1) is ability grouping educationally use-
ful?52 2) are I.Q. tests accurate standards for placement in ability
groups?" and 3) are varying results on I.Q. tests by race due entirely
50. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
51. Punke, Competence as a Basis of Student Assignment, 32 ALA. LAw. 24, 40
(1971).
52. See generally M. Bryan, Ability Grouping: Status, Impact, and Alternatives,
June 1971 (published on microfiche by Educ. Research Information Center, catalog
no. ED 052 260); D. Esposito, Homogeneous and Heterogeneous Grouping: Princi-
pal Findings and Implications of a Re-search of the Literature, July 1971 (pub-
lished on microfiche by Educ. Research Information Center, catalog no. ED 056
150).
53. Several educational theorists have written that I.Q. tests are accurate pre-
dictors of academic achievement. See V. Bennett, Intelligence Testing in the Schools,
1970 (published on microfiche by Educ. Research Information Center, catalog no.
ED 045 708); V. Bhushan, Comparison of IQ and Socioeconomic Index in Pre-
dicting Grade Point Average, Mar. 6, 1970 (published on microfiche by Educ. Re-
search Information Center, catalog no. ED 039 304); D. Goslin, The Social Conse-
quences of Predictive Testing in Education, May 1965 (published on microfiche by
Educ. Research Information Center, catalog no. ED 018 219); Hughson, The Case for
Intelligence Testing, in CONTEMPORARY IsSUES IN EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY 366
(1970). However, other theorists have denied that I.Q. tests are useful for any pur-
pose. See L. Barrit, Intelligence Tests and Educationally Relevant Measurements,
Sept. 1, 1967 (published on microfiche by Educ. Research Information Center, catalog
no. ED 016 255); R. Nichols, Implications of Racial Differences in Intelligence for
Educational Research and Practice, Feb. 6, 1969 (published on microfiche by Educ.
Research Information Center, catalog no. ED 033 179); Yourman, The Case Against
Group IQ Testing, in CONTEmPORARY IssuEs IN EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY 371 (1970).
There does seem to be a general agreement that I.Q. tests do not measure innate
learning potential. See Garcia, IQ-The Conspiracy, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Sept.
1972, at 40; Mercer, IQ-The Lethal Label, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Sept. 1972, at 44.
For a summary of American attitudes toward I.Q. tests, see 0. Brim, Experiences and
Attitudes of American Adults Concerning Standardized Intelligence Tests, 1965 (pub-
lished on microfiche by Educ. Research Information Center, catalog no. ED 018 209).
For the effect of tester's attitude on I.Q. test results, see J. Jacobs, Expectancy and
Race: Their Influences upon the Scoring of Individual Intelligence Tests, Mar. 14,
1570 [Vol. 51
LIMITING TESTS FOR GROUPING
to environmental factors?54 These conflicts make the legal determi-
nations on these issues more difficult. As for the first question,
the courts seem willing to allow the decision of local educators to con-
trol. The courts found the second and third questions to be central to
a decision on de facto segregation claims in Riles and Hobson. The
failure of defendants to provide the court with an adequate answer
to these questions ultimately decided Riles against them. Their best
possible argument, one that defendants failed to make, was presented
by Kenneth Eells in a well-known article on cultural bias in I.Q. tests.55
Eells has suggested that if what is wanted from I.Q. tests is a good
prediction of how well a child will do in school, then cultural bias is a
necessary element of these tests.56 The school system as it now ex-
ists bases judgments of a student's progress on a white middle-class
standard, the same one on which I.Q. test results are based. Most edu-
cators feel that used for this limited purpose, I.Q. tests are excellent
instruments.r Problems arise when people look on these tests as meas-
ures of some innate ability and not of present ability to achieve on a
certain level.5 Even when I.Q. tests are used for this limited pur-
pose, however, the results can be disastrous for the child involved.
Teachers tend to look at a low I.Q. score as signifying a child with
limited educational potential when, the child, especially if he is black,
possibly has a deprived educational background.59 As a result of
this attitude on the part of teachers, the child begins to view himself as
incapable of learning and begins to perform at a low level.6 0 This re-
1972 (published on microfiche by Educ. Research Information Center, catalog no.
ED 068 529); Watson, IQ-The Racial Gap, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Sept. 1972, at 48.
54. A recent article by Arthur Jensen suggests that racial differences in I.Q.
scores are not due to cultural bias, but rather to genetic differences between blacks
and whites. Jensen, How Much Can We Boost IQ and Scholastic Achievement, 39
HARv. EDUC. REv. 1 (1969). All that can be definitely said about this theory is
that it is extremely unpopular. See E. Epps, Race, Intelligence, and Learning: Some
Consequences of the Misuse of Test Results, Aug. 1970 (published on microfiche by
Educ. Research Information Center, catalog no. ED 048 423); E. Gordon, Jensenism:
Another Excuse for Failure to Educate, Sept. 1969 (published on microfiche by
Educ. Research I formation Center, catalog no. ED 037 519). Not enough evidence
exists on either side to make a definite decision, as Jensen readily admits. See
generally A. Jensen, Intelligence, Learning Ability, and Socioeconomic Status, Feb. 8,
1968 (published on microfiche by Educ. Research Information Center, catalog no. ED
023 725).
55. Eells, Some Implications for School Practice of the Chicago Studies of
Cultural Bias in Intelligence Tests, 23 HARv. Enuc. REV. 284 (1953).
56. Id. at 293.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 294.
59. 343 F. Supp. at 1312-13; Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 489 (D.D.C.
1967), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 801 (1969).
60. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 484 (D.D.C. 1967), appeal dismissed,
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suit could be avoided by renaming the tests and by expressly limiting
their function to prediction of academic performance.01 Thus, a
strong argument can be constructed in defense of the cultural bias pres-
ent in the I.Q. tests now used.
The Riles decision does little to advance the legal answers to the
questions posed above. The failure of the defendants to bring forth
their strongest potential argument prevented the court from analyzing
the varying educational theories. One significant result of the decision
is that the court showed no inclination to extend Hobson into a re-
quirement that classes be integrated. Ability grouping was not abol-
ished, and although the court noted the need for a supplemental sys-
tem to aid culturally deprived blacks, it did not require that the school
system implement one.
Riles can be fairly characterized as a retreat from the far-reaching
possibilities of Hobson. The wide leeway allowed the defendants to
perfect a remedy is a strong indication that this court considered edu-
cators better able to settle the questions raised by the use of I.Q. tests
in ability grouping than the courts. An inference can be drawn that
as long as educators operate in good faith and on reasonable grounds,
the courts will not interpose their own system of classroom division.
This inference draws support from the retreat from a compelling state
interest requirement in Hobson to a rational relationship requirement in
Riles. This retreat was authored despite the presence of the suspect
classification based on race. Thus the decision is at best inconsistent
with the main line of equal protection cases. Judge Peckham's de-
cision not to apply the compelling state interest test can only be attrib-
uted to some unarticulated policy reason, for modem legal precedent
does not support him.6 2
393 U.S. 801 (1969); Eells, supra note 55, at 295. This theory is referred to as the
self-fulfilling prophecy. See R. Rosenthal, PYGMAmON IN Tm CLASSROOM (1968);
J. Evans, Interpersonal Self-Fulfilling Prophecies: Further Extrapolations from the
Laboratory to the Classroom, 1969 (published on microfiche by Educ. Research In-
formation Center, catalog no. ED 034 276); Rosenthal, Self-Fulfilling Prophecy,
PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Sept. 1968, at 44. Contra, E. FLEmING, Teacher Expectancy or
My Fair Lady, Mar. 5, 1970 (published in microfiche by Educ. Research Information
Center, catalog no. ED 038 183).
61. Eells, supra note 55, at 295.
62. This retreat is unusual in that the Supreme Court has used the compelling
state interest test frequently in modem decisions when faced with cases of prima facie
denials of equal protection involving suspe.ct categories, of which race is the leading
one. E.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). In Hobson the compel-
ling state interest test was followed when the court considered the de facto inter-school
segregation charges. 269 F. Supp. at 506. But when the Hobson court considered
the challenge to the track system, it purported to use the rational relationship test.
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This area of the law must necessarily remain unsettled until the
larger questions of inter-school integration are answered. When issues
such as busing are finally laid to rest, the Supreme Court may choose to
advance further in this field by putting a premium on protection of the
individual child's learning experience. Any system relying on testing
will make errors in placement from time to time. Whether the judicial
system will choose to tolerate these mistakes as incidental to the bene-
fits derived from an objective standard of placement remains for the
future.
JACK THORNTON
Constitutional Law-A New Constitutional
Right To An Abortion
The controversy concerning legalized abortion has been active in
the United States for almost twenty years. The medical profession, leg-
islators, and the judiciary have wrestled with the legal, moral, and so-
cial conflicts involved in the abortion issue. Recently in Roe v. Wade1
and a companion case2 the United States Supreme Court determined that
the right of privacy inherent in the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment protected a woman's right to choose whether or not to
Id. at 511. It is unclear why such a distinction is drawn, in Hobson (in form) and in
Riles (in fact), when all the classifications are based on race. The present test for
testing the constitutionality of ability grouping therefore appears to be the rational
relationship test and not the compelling state interest one.
1. 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973).
2. Doe v. Bolton, 93 S. Ct. 739 (1973). The decision is important apart from
Wade because Bolton involved an attack on a relatively liberal abortion law adopted by
Georgia in 1968, GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1202 (1972). The Court determined that in
spite of the liberal nature of the statute it nevertheless could not stand in view of the
standards established in Wade. The statute established certain procedural require-
ments that must be met before an abortion could be performed. These included re-
quirements that the abortion be performed in a hospital accredited by the Joint Com-
mittee on Accreditation of Hospitals; that the operation be approved by the hospital
staff abortion committee; and that the performing physician's judgment be confirmed
by independent examinations of the patient by two other licensed physicians. The
Court held these requirements unconstitutional as having no rational relation to the
statute's purposes, as being unduly restrictive of the patient's rights already safe-
guarded by her physician, and as being an undue infringement on the physician's
right to practice. The statute's residency requirement was found to violate the privi-
leges and immunities clause of the Constitution by denying protection to persons
entering Georgia for medical services.
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terminate her pregnancy, subject only to very limited interference from
the state. This note will discuss two of the constitutionally significant
aspects of the Wade decision-the Court's determination that the ques-
tion was a proper one for judicial resolution under the due process
clause and the Court's decision that the right of privacy includes the
abortion decision. A brief analysis of the common-law and modem
legislative attitudes concerning abortion is helpful in understanding
the Court's holding in Wade.
It is generally accepted that under the English common-law abor-
tion before "quickening" was not a crime.' Similarly, most American
courts have ruled that abortion of an unquickened fetus was not crimi-
nal.4 Some writers believe that a thorough analysis of common-law
history supports the conclusion that women had the common-law lib-
erty of abortion at every stage of gestation. 5 This belief was not shared
by all of the early American courts, however, and several early deci-
sions found the abortion of a quickened fetus to be a misdemeanor. 6
In 1821 Connecticut became the first state to adopt abortion legisla-
tion.7  The statute punished abortion of a quickened fetus but set no
penalty for abortion of a fetus before quickening. Most of the early
statutes dealt severely with abortions of a quickened fetus but pre-
scribed very lenient punishment for abortion prior to that stage.0
During the later decades of the nineteenth century, however, legisla-
tors began to dispense with the quickening distinction and began to
prescribe much harsher penalties. By the end of the 1950's most
states had banned abortion except when necessary to preserve the
mother's life.' 0
Various factors have been advanced to explain enactment of these
3. Lucas, Federal Constitutional Limitations on the Enforcement and Admin-
istration of State Abortion Statutes, 46 N.C.L. Ruv. 730, 731 (1968). "Quickening" is
the first recognizable movement of the fetus in the uterus. It appears usually from the
sixteenth to eighteenth week of pregnancy. 93 S. Ct. at 716.
4. See, e.g., Edwards v. State, 79 Neb. 251, 252, 112 N.W. 611, 612 (1907);
Miller v. Bennett, 190 Va. 162, 169, 56 S.E.2d 217, 221 (1949).
5. E.g., Means, The Pheonix of Abortional Freedom: Is A Penumbral or
Ninth-Amendment Right About To Arise from the Nineteenth-Century Legislative
Ashes of A Fourteenth-Century Common-Law Liberty?, 17 N.Y.L.F. 335, 336-75
(1971).
6. E.g., Smith v. State, 33 Me. 48, 55 (1851); Lamb v. State, 67 Md. 524, 533,
10 A. 208, 208 (1887).
7. Quay, Justifiable Abortion-Medical and Legal Foundations, 49 GEo. L.J.
395, 435 (1961).
8. CoNN. STAT. tit. 22, § 14 (1821).
9. Quay, supra note 7, at 437.
10. For a good survey of state abortion legislation and important judicial deci-
sions on the subject see Quay, supra note 7, at 447-526.
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highly prohibitive criminal abortion statutes. First, Victorian ideals
of morality were elevated above the right of a married couple to choose
if and when to have children.11 These ideals fostered the belief that the
primary function of sexual activity was procreation and that all at-
tempts at abortion and contraception should therefore be prohibited.
Secondly, legislators began attempting to shield the woman from the
unskilled abortionist by enacting what they considered to be protec-
tive legislation.12 Thirdly and most significantly, the surgical proce-
dure involved in an abortion was dangerous because of the lack of
modem antiseptic techniques and anitibiotics. 13 There is also some
authority for the proposition that the legislators were concerned with
the protection of prenatal life. 4
Beginning in the 1950's a movement was initiated to liberalize the
abortion laws. The initial objective was to accomplish this change
through the legislative process, and to this end the American Law Insti-
tute proposed a statute allowing certain therapeutic abortions.-5 Four-
teen states adopted some form of the American Law Institute proposal.Y6
In 1965 Griswold v. Connecticut 7 opened the door for judicial
resolution of the abortion question. In Griswold the Court struck down
a Connecticut statute' s preventing the use of contraceptives on the
ground that it violated a marital right of privacy found in the penum-
bras of the Bill of Rights. A concurring opinion noted that "the en-
tire fabric of the Constitution and the purposes that clearly underlie its
specific guarantees demonstrate that the rights to marital privacy and
to marry and raise a family are of similar order and magnitude as the
fundamental rights specifically protected."' 9  After this decision the
judicial attack on abortion legislation was quickly mounted. In Peo-
ple v. Belous20 the California Supreme Court recognized that "the
fundamental right of the woman to choose whether to bear children fol-
lows from the Supreme Court's and this court's repeated acknowledge-
ment of a 'right to privacy' or 'liberty' in matters relating to mar-
11. Lucas, supra note 3, at 732.
12. Id.
13. Means, supra note 5, at 382-91.
14. Roe v. Wade, 93 S. Ct. 705, 725-26 (1973).
15. MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3 (Proposed Draft 1962).
16. Roe v. Wade, 93 S. Ct. 705, 720 n.37 (1973). This list includes N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-45.1 (Supp. 1971).
17. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
18. Act of March 28, 1879, ch. 78, [1879J Conn. Acts 428 (repealed 1969).
19. 381 U.S. at 495 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
20. 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 915 (1970).
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riage, family, and sex."' 1  Numerous suits challenging abortion stat-
utes were brought in both federal and state courts, and a split of au-
thority developed over the question. 22 The Supreme Court addressed it-
self in Wade to this diversity in the lower courts.
The Court was called upon to determine the constitutionality of
the Texas abortion statute, which permitted abortion only "by medical
advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother. '23  After re-
solving the issue of standing 24 and reviewing the major historic atti-
tudes concerning abortion,25 the Court held that the "right of privacy,
whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of per-
21. Id. at 963, 458 P.2d at 199, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 359.
22. Some courts struck down abortion statutes. Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp.
800 (D. Conn. 1972), vacated and remanded, 93 S. Ct. 1412 (1973); Poe v. Menghini,
339 F. Supp. 986 (D. Kan. 1972); YWCA v. Kugler, 342 F. Supp. 1048 (D.N.J.
1972); Doe v. Scott, 321 F. Supp. 1385 (N.D. I11. 1971), vacated and remanded sub
nom. Hanrahan v. Doe, 93 S. Ct. 1410 (1973); Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293
(E.D. Wis.), appeal dismissed, 400 U.S. 1 (1970); State v. Barquet, 262 So. 2d 431
(Fla. 1972).
Other courts upheld the statutes. Crossen v. Kentucky, 344 F. Supp. 587 (E.D.
Ky. 1972), vacated and remanded, 93 S. Ct. 1413 (1973); Corkey v. Edwards, 322
F. Supp. 1248 (W.D.N.C. 1971), vacated and remanded, 93 S. Ct. 1411 (1973); Stein-
berg v. Brown, 321 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ohio 1970); Rosen v. Board of Medical
Examiners, 318 F. Supp. 1217 (E.D. La. 1970); Cheaney v. State, - Ind. -, 285
N.E.2d 265 (1972); State v. Abodeely, - Iowa -, 179 N.W.2d 347 (1970); State v.
Munson, - S.D. -, 201 N.W.2d 123 (1972), vacated and remanded, 93 S. Ct. 1416
(1973).
23. 93 S. Ct. at 709.
24. 93 S. Ct. at 712-15. The suit was brought by a single pregnant woman, a
doctor who had been arrested for violating the Texas abortion statute, and a married
couple without children. The Court ruled that the latter two plaintiffs lacked standing
to sue, that the doctor alleged no federally protected right not assertable as a defense
in the state prosecution pending against him, and that the married couple's complaint
was too speculative, but the Court upheld the pregnant woman's right to challenge the
statute. Because of the fact that the woman already had delivered her child, the ques-
tion was technically "moot," but the Court, quoting from Southern Pacific Terminal
Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911), held that the issue was "capable of repetition,
yet evading review," and therefore could be heard.
In Doe v. Bolton, 93 S. Ct. 739, 745-46 (1973), the Court granted a group of
physicians standing even though they had not been threatened with prosecution for
violation of the state's abortion statute. The Court granted standing because the
physicians were members of the group against which the statute operates directly and
therefore had a sufficiently direct threat of personal detriment. The Court believed
that they should not be required to become involved in a criminal prosecution before
they could seek judicial relief. The Court distinguished Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497
(1961), in which standing was denied a physician challenging a Connecticut statute
prohibiting the giving of medical advice on the use of contraceptives, by noting that
the Connecticut statute was adopted in 1879 and only one physician had ever been
prosecuted under it. 93 S. Ct. at 746. Conversely, the Georgia statute is recent and
its predecessor had been used in several prosecutions. If the Court believes that a
recent and active statute may be challenged by anyone subject to prosecution under it,
it appears that the standing requirement may have been expanded by the Bolton
decision.
25. 93 S. Ct. at 715-24.
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sonal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as
the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation
of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's deci-
sion whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."20  The Court de-
termined that the right of privacy is not absolute, however, and can be
regulated when the state can show a compelling interest.27
The state has two interests in the formulation of abortion legisla-
tion: protecting the life and health of the mother and protecting po-
tential life. Balancing these interests against those of the mother, the
Court determined that the state's interest in the mother becomes com-
pelling only after the first three months of pregnancy because prior to
that time it is medically safer to have an abortion than to carry the fe-
tus full term.2" Therefore, prior to the fourth month "the attending
physician, in consultation with his patient, is free to determine, with-
out regulation by the State, that in his medical judgment the patient's
pregnancy should be terminated."2 9  Between the beginning of the
fourth month of pregnancy and the point where the state's interest in
protecting potential life becomes compelling, the state may pass legis-
lation reasonably related to the preservation of the woman's health.30
The Court determined that the state's interest in protecting potential life
becomes compelling at the stage of viability.3 After that stage the state
may completely proscribe abortions except where necessary "to pre-
serve the life or health of the mother."32
It is significant that the Court found the question of abortion legis-
lation a proper one for judicial resolution under the due process
clause. The Court noted 3 Justice Holmes' admonition in Lochner v.
New York3 4 that the Constitution "is made for people of fundamen-
tally differing views, and the accident of our finding certain opinions
natural and familiar or novel and even shocking ought not to conclude
our judgment upon the question whether statutes embodying them
26. Id. at 727.
27. Id. at 727-28.
28. Id. at 731-32.
29. Id. at 732.
30. As examples of such legislation the Court suggested requirements based on
the qualifications of persons permitted to perform abortions, the procedure to license
such persons, the facility where the abortion may be performed, and the licensing of
the facility. Id.
31. Id. Viability is the point at which the fetus is potentially able to live out-
side the mother's womb. It is usually placed at about seven months but may occur at
an earlier time. Id. at 730.
32. Id. at 732.
33. Id. at 709.
34. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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conflict with the Constitution of the United States."' In Lochner the
Court had invalidated state legislation designed to regulate working
hours among bakery employees in the State of New York. The stat-
ute was held to violate the right to contract that the Court found to be
a liberty protected by the fourteenth amendment. Justices Harlan"0
and Holmes, 37 in vigorous dissents, felt that the Court had no authority
to hold that the statute violated the due process clause. Lochner typi-
fied what is now known as the era of substantive due process, which
lasted for three decades. This constitutional policy was designed to
prevent legislative control over business, and it placed the burden of
justifying legislation upon the state. It required the invalidation of
economic regulatory legislation unless the state could clearly prove
its relation to the public welfare, a burden that was extremely difficult
to carry.3 8 The Lochner approach was applied by the Court to invali-
date various state regulatory statutes.39 But Nebbia v. New York40
and several subsequent cases41 later firmly rejected this theory. The
final blow was dealt by Justice Black in Ferguson v. Skrupa:42 "We
have returned to the original constitutional proposition that courts do
not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legis-
lative bodies, who are elected to pass laws."4
This repudiation of the Lochner substantive due process approach
has given the defenders of abortion legislation a weapon to use to
persuade courts that the matter of abortion was one strictly for the leg-
islatures. Some judges adopted this approach, believing that the ques-
tion involved the weighing of values that should be accomplished by
the legislators. 44 There appears to be a distinction, however, between
35. Id. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 74.
37. Id. at 75-76.
38. See Hetherington, State Economic Regulation and Substantive Due Process
of Law, 53 Nw. U.L. REV. 13, 22 (1958).
39. E.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
40. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
41. E.g., Lincoln Union v. Northwestern Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949); Olsen
v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379
(1937).
42. 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
43. Id. at 730.
44. See Crossen v. Kentucky, 344 F. Supp. 587, 591 (E.D. Ky. 1972), vacated
and remanded, 93 S. CL 1413 (1973); Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp. 800, 812
(D. Conn. 1972) (dissenting opinion), vacated and remanded, 93 S. Ct. 1412 (1973);
Corkey v. Edwards, 322 F. Supp. 1248, 1254 (W.D.N.C. 1971), vacated and
remanded, 93 S. Ct. 1411 (1973); Doe v. Scott, 321 F. Supp. 1385, 1395 (N.D. Ill.
1971) (dissenting opinion), vacated and remanded sub nom. Hanrahan v. Doe, 93
S. Ct. 1410 (1973); State v. Barquet, 262 So. 2d 431, 440 (Fla. 1972) (dissenting
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the Lochner type of substantive due process and that used in Wade to
invalidate state abortion legislation. The difference is between judi-
cial review of legislation affecting personal, fundamental rights essen-
tial to preserving the guarantees of freedom in our society and legis-
lation dealing with economic regulation and control of an industrialized
nation.45 Several Supreme Court decisions have applied substantive due
process criteria in the area of personal, fundamental rights.40 The
Court in Griswold apparently recognized this distinction:
[W]e are met with a wide range of questions that implicate the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Overtones of some
arguments suggest that Lochner v. New York . . . should be our
guide. But we decline that invitation. . . . We do not sit as a
super-legislature to determine the wisdom, need, and propriety
of laws that touch economic problems, business affairs, or social
conditions. This law, however, operates directly on an intimate
relation of husband and wife .... 47
If the Court in Wade has accepted this distinction in the applica-
tion of substantive due process criteria without clearly acknowledg-
ing it48 and has determined that a fundamental, personal right is in-
volved, the discredited Lochner theory should be no barrier to deter-
mining the constitutionality of a state regulatory statute. The risk that
the Court will substitute its judgment for that of the legislature in de-
termining what is wise economic or social policy is inherent in our sys-
tem of judicial review. The basic problem is not whether a court may
review acts of the legislature but rather how wisely it utilizes this
power to identify, appraise, and weigh the competing interests. De-
opinion); Cheaney v. State, - Id. -, -, 285 N.E.2d 265, 269 (1972); State v.
Munson, - S.D. -, -, 201 N.W.2d 123, 127 (1972), vacated and remanded, 93
S. Ct. 1416 (1973).
45. See Emerson, Nine Justices in Search of A Doctrine, 64 MIcH. L. Rv. 219,
224 (1965); Lucas, supra note 3, at 756.
46. E.g., Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) (right to travel);
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) (right of association); Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (right to direct child's education); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923) (right to marry, establish a home, and bring up children).
In Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), the Court applied the due process
clause of the fifth amendment to strike down segregation in the District of Columbia
public schools.
47. 381 U.S. at 481-82 (emphasis added). The holding in Griswold, however,
was not based on the due process clause. Justice Goldberg, concurring in Griswold,
recognized that a state may experiment with economic legislation but not with funda-
mental rights. 381 U.S. at 496. However, he was not speaking for the majority of
the Court.
48. In Wade Justice Stewart discussed the substantive due process problem but
did not draw any distinction between economic and personal rights. 93 S. Ct. at 733-
34 (concurring opinion). In another concurring opinion, Justice Douglas mentioned
the problem in a footnote. Id. at 758 n.4.
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fining the right involved and determining the appropriate standard to
be applied to legislation affecting that right are two basic aspects in-
volved in this type of judicial review. "To refuse to recognize a right
claimed to be basic to our constitutional order for fear that the Court,
in exercising its power to protect that right, will employ a standard
whereby it usurps the legislative function in determining basic social
policy obscures analysis of the Court's role and denies the Court's re-
sourcefulness in employing standards appropriate to the particular
case."
49
Having examined the method apparently adopted by the Court to
review state abortion legislation, it is necessary to discuss the sub-
stantive right which the Court found to be within the fourteenth amend-
ment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions on state action. The
Court found that the right of privacy includes a woman's decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.50
Although the right of privacy is not explicitly mentioned in the
Constitution, it has been recognized by the Court since 1891.', The
roots of that right have been found to exist in the first amendment,5 2
the fourth and fifth amendments,5" and ninth amendment; 14 in the
penumbras of the Bill of Rights;55 and in the concept of liberty guar-
anteed by the fourteenth amendment.5" It has been applied by the
Court to protect various aspects of the family relationship.5 7  Finally
in Griswold the right was first recognized as an independent doctrine, s
and it has recently been affirmed as applicable to the protection of the
family relationship.59
49. Kauper, Penumbras, Peripheries, Emanations, Things Fundamental and
Things Forgotten: The Griswold Case, 64 MicH. L. REV. 235, 258 (1965).
50. 93 S. Ct. at 727.
51. In Union-Pacific R.R. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891), the Court
noted: "No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common
law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own per-
son, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestion-
able authority of law."
52. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
53. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 350 n.5 (1967); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
54. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1965) (Goldberg, J., con-
curring).
55. Id. at 484-85.
56. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
57. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (marriage); Prince v. Massachu-
setts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (family relationships); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535, 536 (1942) (procreation); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35
(1925) (education of children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923)
(child rearing).
58. See Emerson, supra note 45, at 228.
59. The Court in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), said, "If the right
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In order to find whether this right should be applied to abortions
the Court in Wade had first to determine that the right to an abortion
was "fundamental," for "only personal rights . . . deemed to be 'funda-
mental'. . . are included in this guarantee of personal privacy."6 The
only justification given by the Court in granting such status to the abor-
tion decision was the possible detrimental effects on the mother if
she were compelled to deliver the child. These included direct phy-
sical harm, a distressful future life, impairment of mental and physical
health due to child care, and the possible stigma attached to an unwed
mother.0 1 Although these are certainly weighty considerations, per-
haps the Court should have elaborated more fully its finding that the
abortion decision is a "fundamental" right. "Fundamental" has been
defined as being "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," 2 as be-
ing "rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people,"'6 3 and as
one of "those 'fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie
at the base of all our civil and political institutions.' ",64 Since the state
is required to demonstrate a compelling interest in order to regulate
any fundamental right65 and since statutes must be narrowly drawn
so not to exceed this interest, 66 it is hazardous for the Court to grant
"fundamental" status without sufficient justification, for if it does, a
significant number of state regulations may be in jeopardy. In addi-
tion to examining the effects of an unwanted child on the woman,
the Court might have noted that "the Griswold decision rested upon the
broadest and most sweeping principles of substantive constitutional
law" 67 and that the abortion right might be considered more impor-
tant than the rights involved in Griswold. The use of contraceptives
could be considered a first line of defense against an unwanted child, but
of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual. . . to be free from unwar-
ranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the
decision whether to bear or beget a child." Id. at 453. Justice Stewart, concurring
in Wade, noted that this right necessarily includes the woman's decision whether to end
her pregnancy or not. 93 S. Ct. at 735.
60. 93 S. Ct. at 726. The Court relied on the test for fundamental status given
in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), holding that the right must be
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty ..
61. 93 S. Ct. at 727.
62. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
63. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
64. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932).
65. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
66. NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964).
67. Rosen v. Board of Medical Examiners, 318 F. Supp. 1217, 1234 (E.D. La.
1970) (dissenting opinion).
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an abortion is definitely the final means available 8 Then the Court
would at least have established some precedent for its determination.
Combined with the fact that at the time the Constitution was adopted
women had the right to an abortion of a fetus before quickening, 9
these arguments would have made the finding of a fundamental right
more justifiable.
Once the right to an abortion is found to be fundamental, the Court
must determine the state's interests involved so that they can be bal-
anced with the rights of the mother. It is in the process of determin-
ing the state's interests that the major differences of opinion have
arisen, for there is present one highly significant factor that was not
present in Griswold-the existence of a fetus. Even if the courts are
willing to agree that the state's interest in protecting the woman's health
is not sufficiently compelling to justify regulation during all stages of
pregnancy, differing opinions as to the status of the fetus have made
a resolution of the state's interest in protecting potential life extremely
difficult.70
The opponents of reform point to the fact that in other areas of
the law the rights of the fetus are protected.71 Proponents counter
with the observation that in all these areas the rights are protected only
if the fetus is born alive or if the right reflects the parent's interests.72
Proponents also argue that if a fetus constituted human life, the destruc-
tion of the fetus would be murder and that "no prosecutor ever re-
turned a murder indictment charging the taking of the life of a fetus. '7'
The controversy revolves around the religious and moral question of
when a developing fetus acquires "life," or becomes a "human being,"
or attains the status of a "person." As one lower court wisely noted,
"[Wle are constrained simply to conclude that the great conflict
raised by this issue is beyond the competence of judicial resolution."74
Another district court concluded, "[F]or the purposes of this decision,
we think it is sufficient to conclude that the mother's interests are su-
68. Id. at 1237.
69. Means, supra note 5, at 374-75.
70. See Drinan, The Inviolability of the Right To Be Born, 17 W. RES. L. REV.
465 (1965).
71. For a discussion of the rights accorded the fetus see Louisell, Abortion, The
Practice of Medicine and the Due Process of Law, 16 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 233, 235-44
(1969).
72. See People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 969, 458 P.2d 194, 203, 80 Cal. Rptr.
354, 363 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970).
73. Clark, Religion, Morality, and Abortion: A Constitutional Appraisal, 2
LoYo A U.L. REv. 1, 10 (1969).
74. YWCA v. Kugler, 342 F. Supp. 1048, 1075 (D.NJ. 1972).
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perior to that of an unquickened embryo, whether the embryo is mere
protoplasm . . . or a human being. . . 7 This position has been
criticized as being opposed to a basic concept of American law that
human beings have a right to live.76
It appears that the issue can be viewed in such a manner that all
references to "life," "human being," and "person" can become a
mere battle of semantics. Adopting such an approach, the Supreme
Court in Wade believed that no resolution of the question of when "life"
begins was necessary. 77  Instead the Court treated the abortion issue as
one involving state interference with individual rights and liberty that,
as such, could be resolved within the framework of the Constitution."8
Viewing the controversy in this way and recognizing the many similar-
ities between the typical abortion statute and the Connecticut contracep-
tive statute struck down in Griswold,7" the Court's opinion in Wade
seems to be a proper extension of the right of privacy to protect the
mother from the consequences of an unwanted child.
The fact that the Supreme Court declined to accept the district
court's determination that the right of privacy was found in the ninth
amendment and instead found the right to be inherent in the due process
clause could indicate that at least seven justices8" have adopted the so-
called fundamental rights interpretation of the fourteenth amendment.
This theory finds no necessary relationship between the fourteenth
amendment and the Bill of Rights but views the due process clause as
incorporating those principles "implicit in the concept of ordered lib-
erty." 81  The divergent views expressed in Griswold over where the
right of privacy was founds' prompted one writer to question whether
75. Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293, 301 (E.D. Wis. 1970), appeal dis-
missed, 400 U.S. 1 (1970).
76. Fox, Abortion: A Question of Right or Wrong?, 57 A.B.A.Y. 667, 669
(1971).
77. 93 S. Ct. at 730. However, since the Court held that the state's interest in
protecting potential life becomes compelling when the fetus becomes viable, it can be
argued that the Court actually believes viability to be the point when life begins.
78. See Lucas, supra note 3, at 738.
79. See Leavy & Kummer, Abortion and the Population Crisis; Therapeutic
Abortion and the Law; New Approaches, 27 Omo ST. L.J 647, 674 (1966).
80. Wade was a seven-to-two decision. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion
for the Court, with Justices Stewart, Burger, and Douglas concurring. Justices Rehn-
quist and White dissented.
81. J. ISRAEL & W. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROcEDURE IN A NUTSHELL 5 (1971).
82. Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, found it in a penumbra of the Bill
of Rights, 381 U.S. at 480-86. Justice Goldberg seemed to discover it hidden in the
ninth amendment, id. at 486-99 (concurring opinion); Justices Harlan and White be-
lieved the right to be inherent in the due process clause, id. at 499-507 (concurring
opinions). Justices Black and Stewart refused to "find" the right anywhere since it is
not specifically mentioned in the document, id. at 507-31 (dissenting opinions).
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the Court would find that rights not specified in the Bill of Rights are
nevertheless protected by the due process clause.83 The Wade decision
has answered that question in the affirmative.
The Wade decision has several practical consequences in addition
to its constitutional implications. The decision rendered virtually
every state abortion statute invalid."4 The so-called abortion mills in
which any woman with enough money could obtain an abortion will be
eliminated, along with the need for some women to travel to another
state or country to obtain the services of a licensed physician. Those
concerned with population control now have a legitimate tool with
which to work. Competent doctors can now feel free to provide
what is best for their patients without undue concern for legal interfer-
ence. Most importantly, a woman who has no other hesitations about
abortion will no longer be forced to evade the law. Since the decision
was quite detailed, the states should have an adequate guide to the type
of regulation that is now permissible. Since the leaders of the Catholic
Church are violently denouncing the decision,8" however, a struggle
may emerge between the Catholic hospitals and state enforcement of the
new procedure, expecially in areas where the Catholic hospital is the
only one available.
In light of the Wade decision the Supreme Court appears to be ready
to apply substantive due process standards to those rights found to be
personal and fundamental, whether they are specifically mentioned in the
Bill of Rights or not. In addition, the Court may apply the right of
privacy to more varied situations in the future. The practical conse-
quences of the abortion decision have evoked both criticism and praise
from the various factions concerned with the abortion controversy,80
but in the end, as one speaker has said, "this whole matter is eventually
going to be resolved by the conscience of the individual who desires
to have an abortion or not, to the exclusion of what the law, the mor-
alist, or the medical profession has to say."18 7
ROBERT L. WATT Im
83. See Kauper, supra note 49, at 249.
84. It appears that only the New York abortion statute, N.Y. PENAL LAW §
125.05 (McKinney Supp. 1972), may survive the Wade decision. This provision al-
lows an abortion during the first twenty-four weeks of pregnancy without qualifica-
tion, if performed by a duly licensed physician with the woman's consent.
85. NEWSWEEK, Feb. 5, 1973, at 27.
86. Id.
87. Marchetti, Symposium-Law, Morality, and Abortion, 22 RTrro .s L. REV.
415, 423 (1968).
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